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A model for investiga ,*, -. e.C rative research and development programs is
formulated. Cost-ronstrained optimization methods are used in an expected value
formulation for systems which have reached the concept development stage. For
the remaining projects, those in basic research and exploratory development, decision
rules for altering funding levels are suggested. The principal variables considered in
the model are (1) the relative value of a system, a subjective value judgement,
(2) the expected life of the system, (3) decision maker time preference, and (4) the
cost of the system. A management information system for implementing the model
is proposed which allows the user to focus on the trade-off implications of any of
the alternatives available for modifying the budget of the R & D program. The
specific decision problems the model addresseýs are those faced by the R&D planners
of the U. S. Army. However, the model could also be applied to industrial
research and development programs. No extensive knowledge (.f mathematics is
requir2d of the reader; however, explanations of various matehmatical concepts
are discussed in an appendix.
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L INTRODUCTION
The information processing capacity of any one man is limited. Faced withI
potentially enormous quantities of data pertaining to a decision problem, the
task of the decision maker is to select the significant information from the trivial
and to identify an appropriate course of action. However, even the identification
phase of this process is a difficult task when the problem is as large as that of
budgeting the research and development program of the U. S. Army. Narrowing
the scope of the problem to one of selecting a budget for a particular system under
development makes the problem more manageable, but the impact of this selection
on the program as a whole may not be ieadily visible. With limited resources. a
decision on a budget for one system necessarily affects all the others. The decision
problem then becomes one of identifying what should be sacrificed if any system
is to be increased. In an R & D program as large as that of the Army's, the alterna-
tives are almost countless and the time available for considering the problem is
linited.
The Computer Assisted Research and Development Budget Optimization Model
(CARDBOMB) is a cost-constrained, value maximization model which considers
the interactions of the budgets of all the projects in the R & D p:ogram. It adds
insight to the question; "Based on the information gathered during the planning
phase concerning the value and cost of esch proposed project, how should X
billion dollars be distributed among these projects?"
For development programs which are at or b!yond the coiicept formulation
stage of development, the model uses optimization techniques for providing insight
into this question. The variables considered in the model are:
5
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1. The value of a system (the end product rcf a developmer' plan); a function
of tLae, need, useful life, uncertainty and dollar costs.
2. The cost of a system; a function of development, procurement and oper.
ating costs, performance characteristics and operational readiness dates,
time and uncertainty.
The model also deals with basic research and exploratory development projects,
i.e., those not directly associated with a progrim which has reached the concept
development stage. Optimization methods are not used for these projects. but
decision rules are suggested for investigating alternative budgets.
Methods for quantifying the value of a system are discussed at length. Although
the meaning of the terms "value" and "system" are dealt with more explicitly
later, it 3hould prove useful to introduce them here. An R & D system is the end
product that is expected to result from one or more projects, e.g., the goal of a
system's development plan. In tie hardware area the Cheyenne helicopter or the
MBT 70 tank are examples of systems. In a non-hardware area such as research in
human performance, a system is the specific knowledge that is expected to be gained
from one or more research projects. For example a system in the category of
human performance might be termed "extending the endurance limits of the individual
soldier," consisting of a number of research or test projects. Systems are then
categorized by general type, e.g., air mobility, missiles, human performance, etc.
Within these categories experts are asked to use their own subjective value judgement
in rating the relative importance they place on the systems in: their category. Methods
are then devised for transforming the interval scale of measurement scores of each
category onto an int.'rval scale for the entire R & 1, program so that the value of a
system in one category can be related to the value of a system in another. Thus
value, rather than being some intrinsic property o! a system, is r p,,. ,ptive notion I
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derived by considering what the system is designed to accomplish, and how much this
capability is required.
A. FORMULATION OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
Before beginning the development of the model, it should prove tseful to
briefly discuss how Program 6. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE),
of the Army budget is formulated.1
Requirements for new weapon systems, and therefore R & D projects, are
identified by a number of organizations. First, the intelligence community makes
known the current and projected capabilities of potential enemies. Second, the
studies conducted by the Combat Developments Command and other agencies con-
cerning the organization and tactical employment of the Army vf the future identify
areas in which weapons technology must be advanced. Additionally, technologict
advances have their own way of creatih - needs for new systems. For example,
a breakthrough in research on tank engnes may lead to the decision that the most
cost-effective step that can be taken is to develop a new tank. This ties in closely
with a fourth way that ne 'ds arise, technological obsolescence. Some systems,
designed with the technology of the past, have lost much of their initial value due
to counter developments by potential enemies.
All of these needs, or requirements, are channeled into the Army's in-house
R & D community for validation of the need and investigation of possible alter-
natives. This process, which includes extensive investigation of the new technologies
that would have to be developed to support the various alternatives, is called 6AV
concept formulation stage. Finally the point is reached where a development plan
IFor a more detailed discussion of the Army'sI R & D organiz.2 n and procedures,
as well as the overall Department of Defense management of K &I D, ,ee Sanders [ref. 11.
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item projects in Program 6 of the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP), a planning and
budgeting document maintained by the Army's Chief of Research and Development
(CRD). It should be noted at this point that not all of the more than 600 line item
projects in Program 6 are directly related to a specific system. Many of them per-
tain to overhead of the R & D in-house community (Sub-Program 6.5 - Management
and Support) as well as basic research (Sub-Program 6.1) not directly associated
with a particui•r system. 4 Program 6, like all the Army budget programs, might
be called a living document. As was mentioned, new projects are added every time
a new DCP is approved. Additionally, within the bounds of the threshold points,
DA may often alter the funding levels of various projects. However at some point
in time during the annual budget cycle, the CRD submits the particular Program 6
that he recommends for inclusion in the Army budget to be submitted to DOD for
approval and forwarding to the President. For tne purposes of this paper, this five
year funding schedule for all Program 6 projects and the funding schedules for each
of them in the years beyond the FYDP up to the last year in which RDTE funds
are planned will be called the base case.
B. THE PROBLEM: INVESTIGATING ALTERNATIVE BUDGETS
Once a Program 6 base case has been recommended by the Chief of Research
and Development, the final decision on the program to be recommended to the
President is far fro,.i reached. The Army's Budget Review Committee (BRC) and
other top-level committees as the Secretary of the Army o! the Chief or Staff may
direct must then investigate how this base case fits in with other Army programs,
and what adjustments might or must be made to insure compliat,ce with national
4 More detail concerning ihe conteni of Program 6 will be pres, ted in Section II,
C, "A Taxonomy of R & D Systems."
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security objectives and the DOD fiscal guidance constraints. This is not to imply
that these considerations are disregarded in arriving at the Program 6 base case. On
the contrary, it was formulated throughout the year in an iterative fashion with just
these considerations in mind. However, during the "budget crunch" months of
October through December, difficult trade-off dec.ions must be made, and the BRC
plays an increasingly important role. 5 In essence khey must investigate alternative.
mixes between Army programs which in turn determine the level, or total bucigat
constraint, of each. To do this with as much insight as possible in order to avoid
setting arbitrary limits on the levels of programs, it is also necessary for them to
investigate mixes within the programs. Unfortunately the time constraints of the
PPBS cycle may limit this investigation substantially. It is not inconceivable to
imagine that only the highest cost or critically important items get carefully investi-
gated, while other projects in a program might have to experience something
approaching an "across the board" percentage change, usually a reduction. While
no empirical evidence is offered here to support this contention, it would appear
logical that the more time available for identifying and investigating alternatives,
the better the decision.
Ultimately a budget gets approved by the Secretary of the Army for forwarding to DOD,
but the budgeting problem is still far from resolved. DOD continues to nmake Program Budget
Decisions which are either accepted or rebutted by the Services. Additionally, either because
the Office of Management and Budget has altered the budget constraint of DOD as a whole
or because DOD wishes to investigate the alternative mixes between the Services, the
A•my may be directed to submit ' new program constrained at some different level.
The sometimes severe time constraints on tnese important delibrations and
the need for vast qu•intities of readily available information pertaining to individual
5 Although the BRC is not the only agency making recommen, ions to the SA
and COS concerning the budget, for simplicity this paper will refer ly to thum as
the principal advisors.
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programs has led tho Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Airny (AVCSA)
the Army's coordinating office for matters pertaining to the PPBS, to move toward
automated management information systems. This paper is directed at assisting in
this effort within the context of the existing decision problem and organizational
structure. Sic specific decision problems representing the range of options for
altering the Program 6 budget are addressed. These are:
1. Should the funding of a system be reduced?
2. Should the funding of a system be increased?
3. Should the schedule of a system be slipped, freeing funds for a particular
year? (Slipping is defined as delaying the start of a proposed devAopment
program, or cutting it off somewhere in mid-cycle with the intent of
continuing it at a later date.)
4. Should a n(w system just firishing the concept development stage be
added to the program?
5. SlTuld a sy.bten be dropped from the Ahogram?
6. Should funds be added to or taken away from the total RDTE budget?
The extent of the six: decision problems addressed by CARDBOMB shows that its
potential users might be the planning staffs of the Director of the Army Budget,
the BRC, the AVCSA or the CRD.
C. CONSIDERATIONS IN MODE;LING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
There are characteristics of R & D programs, both military and industrial,
that make them particularly difficult to manage. A brief introduction to st,.me of
these problems is presented here so that the reader will be cognizant of them and
follow more carefully how each of them are dealt with in the model. Chief among
these difficuftles is ur.certainty.
The uncertainty of the need for a particular system, sometimrn called scenario
risk, is usually the most uncertain factor. The intelligence commuLay might forecast
11
that by 1986 every Russian soldier wiMl be equipped with a man-packed jet propulsion
unit capable of moving him above ground at 30 knots for great distances. There
may, however, be a considerable question as to the validity of the forecast. Addition.
ally there may be uncertainty as to the best approach to counter this move. Finally,
no one can state for sure that by 1986 the Russians will be a potential threat.
Perhaps, if the future were known, the need might be greater in countering a gamma
ray gun development in Albania.
The uncertainty of the availability date and ultimate performance characteristics
of a weapon system undergoing development are termed technological uncertainty.
Given the varying degrees of the state of the art in different technologies, it may
become necessary to settle for less than the system's performance objectives forrmu-
lated in its current DCP. On the other hand a major technological breakthrough
might allow Uhe achievement of far more value than is currently envisioned.
Similarly, the technological development problems might take so long to resolve
that, by the system's availability date, it has already been overtaken by events.
For example, some counter R & D move by a potential nnemy either now or in
the future might seriously degrade the value of the system as currently perceived.
This introduces the notion, to be explored in greater depth in Chaptcr 2, that the
value of a completed system is not constant over tim-e.
The third significant factor is cost uncertainty. Particularly during the early
concept formulation stage, R & D and other important cost estimates might be far
off the mark. Even as development of the system continues, PEMA and OMA cost
projections still may prove to be significantly different than projected. 6
"rocurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army (PEMA) and Operation and
Maintenanc-., Army (OMA) are two additional budget programs. Bw> !i the procure-
ment and operation and maintenance costs are costs that must be ( nsidered with
RDTE funds in the "develop or do not develop" type decisions.
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Examples of the implications of these uncertain factors illuminate their inter-
dependence. If for a given system, RDTE costs have been estimated too low, PEMA
funds for this system and others might have to be transferred, thus lowering the
total, overall value to be gained. If the need has been overstated and Russia never
fields jet-propelled soldiers, then the volue of our jet-propelled Russian barrier may
be zero, not tu mention the value list from other systems that might have been.
develoned with the same funds.
Another difficulty encountered in the modeling of R & D is its lack of a unit of
measure; i.e., it is meaningless to talk about dollars per unit of R & D. What type
of an R & D unit of output could be defined such that two million dollars would
buy twice as rany units as one million? The MARK TWAIN, a Leontif Input-Output
model currently being used by DA in studying the force structure budgeting problem,
has as a nec^zsary input the cost per unit for F,,,,e X. Th, EXECUTIVE
GUIDANCE/DECISION MODELS, an eutomated management information system
also used in DA for studying the PEMA, OMA, manpower and force structure
7budgets, also require these linear cost estimating relationships. The activity analysis
structure of these two models makes them inappropriate for R & D. primarily
because of this lack of a unit of measure of output.
It may be enlightening in this introduction to compare the purposes of these
two models and the one proposed in this paper. The MARK TWAIN is primarily
a costing model. The user inputs the force structure he is investigatirg and the
model generates its cost. THE DEAN MACHINE, on the other hand, incorporates
some built-in, parameterized decision rules for the alteration of the budgets of
7The reader acquainted with Army budgeting models will prol. -1y recognize
this by its more familiar name, "lILE DEAN MACHINE, after its pr :pal author,
LTC A. M. R. Dean.
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specific line items in the budget program the user is investigating. For example, the
purchase of a 2½-ton truck might be the first priority for reduction in the PEMA
budget, but only a five percent reduction can be absorbed. The user inputs the
total budget constraint he is investigating for the PEMA program, and the model
uses the decision rules to produce a aew program constrained at this level.
CARDBOMB has a similar objective. The user inputs a toial RDTE budget constraint,
and then based on one of a number of specific strategi-s he may wish to empioy,
a girgle, mathematically optimal alternative is presented which both maximizes the
value of the entire program and meets the total budget constraint specified. Of
course as has been stated, "value" will be defined more explicitly later.
Despite the problems posed by uncertainty, lack of a unit of measure and
other factors, extensive efforts have been made to model R & D, both in the military
and the industrial sectors. The primary emphasis, however, has been on project
selection in the general field called capital budgetinrg. Project selection models have
as their primary emph•,sis the decision problem faced when a new system is proposed.
For the most part they are not concerned with incremental changes to the budgets
of existing development programs. However some of these models could be very
useful to the Army and are discussed further in the text.
There are, however, at least two models which to some degree do address the
problem of determining optimal incremental budget changes. The first of these
was developed by McGlauchlin [ref. 4] for the Honeywell Corporation. In brief,
division managers were surveyed and asked to score on a numerical scale how they
rated the relative profit potential of the R & D projects that were on-going or
proposed. The scores were aggregated to arrive at a number representing the value
of a project relative to the value of one currently being marketed. iis gave the
14
planners a rough estimate of the expected profit potential of the projects rated.
The scientific department was then asked what the earliest, latest and most likely
completion times were for each project for various numbers of scientific teams
assigned to it. All of these factors were then entered into a mathematical program
which resulted in more efficient manpower utilization.
This example points out a significant difference between modeling industrial
and military R & D programs (or any budget category, for that matter). The
objective function in industrial models is generally uni-dimensional with one
motive - maximize profit in dollars. In military R & D it is usually meaningless
to assign dollar figures to the value of systems. A model called MEASURE I which
was recently developed for DA by the Research Analysis Corporation (RAC)
follows the same general formulation as the Honeywell model, but suggests a more
appropriate iay of quanLifying the value of ,ysLti1As [ref. 5]. Many of the ideas
that resulted in the model presented in this paper came from MEASURE I, and
the author wishes to credit RAC for their work. However, the end product,
CARDBOMB, is a model quite different from MEASURE I in its theoretical
structure.
15
1H. QUANTIFYING THE VALUE OF A
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM
Before a model of a complex program can be formulated, certain parameters
have to be identified and measured. This chapter introduces the concept of the
value of a system undergoing development; what it is and how it might be quantified.
A. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF VALUE
Terms such as value, utility, worth, effectiveness and cost can be quite vague
if they are not carefully defined. This section introduces the mcaning of value as
used in this paper by first pointing out some of its characteristics.
First, value may be either objective or subjective. Objective value reflects
some generally accepted measure like dollars. S' 4,jective value, often called
utility, can only indirectly be put in a market context. The value of an item becomes
the equivalent of what a particular observer is willing to give up to get it. Another
observer might feel differently about the exchange.
The values of two or more systems can also be commensurate or non-commensurate
with each other. If the value of two items, each measured on differ.,nt scales, can
be transformed to the same scale, then they are said to be commensurate. For
objective measures it is generally a simple matter to determine relations between
value scales. If the value of item A is measured in dollars and item B in cents,
one simply multiplies tl.e value of B by 100 to make the two values commensurate.
In the subjective measurement sense the value of two systems can be considered
commensurate if the observer can relate the value of system A to that of B in terms
meaningful to him. A pilot may say that as far as he Ls voncerned, ,, overall
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value the Army will get from the Cheyenne program ia greater than the value of
the Cobra. Since be can compare these, they are commensurate to him. The value
of two systems are non-commerisurate in the subjective sense if the observer cannot
relate their values. The same pil,,t may have no feeling for the value of the
Cheyenne program relative to one of the tank programs because of his lack of
familiarity with the latter. Even if he were thoroughly familiar with both, the
differences in their missions may not allow him to reasonably compare their values.
A third characteristic of value is concerned with how many attributes must
be considered in its measurement. The value of a system is single attributed if it
can be considered to accomplish only one significant objective, e.g., generate
profit. It has multiple attributes if more than one significant objective must be
considered in its determination. For example, it may move, shoot and communicate.
Lastly, -neasures of value must be time dattU and scenariu related. The value
of a system is generally not considered to be constant over time. It cannot be
expecte6 that the Cheyenne will have the same value in 1976 as it will in 1986.
Similarly, a system's value can be considerably different for two different scenarios,
or operating environments, in which it might be placed. The value of the MBT 70
tatik may vary considerably depending on whether it is performing a combat mission
in the Vietnam Delta or the Fulda Gap.
Usally th-,e is considerable disparity in the ease by which value can be
measured for industrial projects and military systems. Risking a highly oversimplified
generalization, it might be said that the measurements of value in business models
are objective, single attributed and commensurate, while in the military they must
be subjective, multi-attributed, and most likely only subsets of systems are
commensurate, i.e., Cheyenne and Cobra.
171
B. OBSTACLES TO MEANINGFUL MEASURES OF VALUE
If the value of a military R & D program is characterized in this way, significant
obstacles are raised in arriving at meaningful measures. CARDBOMB uses various
methods to handle each of the obstacles discussed in this section.
If value is considered to be subjective, who is to be selected as the observer to
render his judgement? Strictly theoretical models beg this issue and call him the
decision maker. One might argue that this is the Secretary of the Army, but who
can reasonably expect one man to have the necessary knowledge of each of the
more than 600 projects, or even the time to think about it. Alternatively, some
top level advisory board knowledgeable of all the systems might be surveyed,
raising the additional problem of how all their replies should be aggregated, i.e.,
which one of them has tha "right" answer.
The m0.1el builder is also faced with problew~s caused by the multiple attribut*
nature of value. Which measures of effectiveness should be selected? How are
they to be measured, weighted and aggregated to arrive at a single value measurement?
Whast indirect objectives, that is, extraneous to the primary mission of the program
should be considered? A glance at the following incomplete list will show that
these indirect objectives seldom appear irn any cost-effectiveness study, but have a
definite impact on the decision problem.
1. Support of an adequate R & D community. If the budget of System X
is substantially reduced, forcing the bankruptcy of Company Y, how li
the future R & D effort affected?
2. Political. If System X is dropped, what will result from Senator Smith's
reaction?
3. Enemy R & D reaction. If we develop System X, what can we expect
the Russ*ans to do?
I1
• I.,
Another obstacle to the development of a useful model of the RDTE Program
is the non-commensurability characteristic of value. To construct a model, value
must be measured. To construct an optimization model, the value of each system
must be mewsured on the same scale, and the type of scale used is significant. This
point should become clearer in the next section.
Even within commensurate subsets of systems, i.e., those designed to accomplish
generally similar objectives, additional obstacles arise tc complicate the measurement
of value. Most systems are not independent entities designed to operate in an
environment all their own. More likely they achieve their value in a scenario in
which they operate with other systems. Therefore the values of two or more systems
may be interdependent rather than independent. The value of Tank System A
might be considerably different when Tank System B is developed and when it is not.
Still more questions must be addressed in considering lhow to measure value.
How should the three types of uncertainty be considered in the measurement of
value? Should the value of a system be measured in the worst scenario envisioned,
or the most likely? Should a conservative or optimistic view be taken in predicting
th, operating characteristics of the resulting system? And similarly, how should
cost uncertainty be considered, since, as has been pointed out, an incorrect estimate
may effect a loss in value to the program or other programs?
This list of obstacles illustrates the magnitude of the problem of measuring
value. All of these considerations mist be addressed in determining how well this
or any other R & D model represents the real world. Following the development
of the valu- measurement segment of thL,- paper, we will return to this list to
discuss how each obstacle was handled.
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C. A TAXONOMY OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS
In moving toward the goal of finding a method for making the value of as
many RDTE projects commensurate as possible, a taxonomy, or classification
scheme, must first be defined whereby " reasonably commensurate subsets" of
systems can be identified. A reasonably commensurate subset will be loosely
defined as a group of systems aimed toward the accomplishment of generally
similar missions or objectives.
The most logical place to begin such a taxonomy is with the one currently
used by the Army and defined in the Army Strategic Objectives Plan (ASOP). It












11. Command and Control
12. Chemical/Biological
13. Nuclear
14. Ballistic Missile Defense
15. Personnel, Care, Protection and Survival
16. Human Performance
17. Counterinsurgency and Special Warfare
18. Environmental Analysis of Military Operations
19. Mapping
20. Construction Methods
21. Research for More than One of the Above
22. Research Associat-l with None of the Above
23. Testing
24. Management and Other Support
Categories 1 through 14 are called Hardware Categories, 15 thiou3 h ýO are Non.
Hardware Categories, and 21 through 24, Support Categories. This paper will use
20
the same classification scheme with the following modifications. Eliminate category
21 and assign its projects to the most valuable8 system it supports. Remove
category 23 and assign its projects to the category of the system it is designed to
test. Eliminate category 22 and assign its projects to a new category called Basic
Research. This category will have, in addition to those projects from the old category
22, all basic resetrch projects which are not a part of some development plan.
For example, there may be a basic research project in support of the development
of MBT 70. This project would be assigned to category 3, Tank/Antitank. Another
basic research project may be aimed toward category 3 but not part of some
development plan. It would be assigned to the new category, Basic Resea-ch.
Most projects that are called basic research or exploratory development would fall
into this new Category 22. To summarize, the categories for this paper are:
Categoricz 1 through 20; no change.
Categories 21 tlrough 24; eliminated and replaced by,
21 Management and Other Support
22 Basic Research
Now that a taxonomy has been defined, all that remains is to decide what
belongs in each category. As was previously mentioned, the Army currently
identifies each line item project as belonging to one of the categories. What is
required for this model, however, is that systems be assigned rather than projects.
Although this idea has been previously introduced, this last sentence requires
considerable expansion. Up to this point the terms "projeot" and "system" have
been used more or less interchangeably. In most of the Systems Analysis literature
on capital budgeting, a project refers to that entity which results in value. In the
RDTE budget, a project is usually one of a group of contracts, all of which go
'Most valuable will be explicitly defined later.
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into the development program which hopefully results in an operational system.
In this model it is the value of the system which we seek to measure, not the
projects. To avoid this ambiguity a system will be defined as one or more RDTE
line item projects or portions of projects which, when taken together, expect to
result in value to the Army. Thus the Cheyenne system from category 1 might
be defined as consisting of three projects; advanced development, test and evaluation,
and operational systems development. 9 This discussion pertaining to the assignment
of systems to categories applies only to categories 1 through 20. Categories 21
and 22 are treated differently than the others in the model.
One additional classification will be assigned to each system. The system will
be further identified as belonging to one of three time periods depending on when,
under reasonable funding levels, it can be expected to reach its operational readi-
ness date (or, for Non-Hardware Categories, the objectives of the rebearch will bc
reached).1 0 The time periods are arbitrarily defined as:
T1  The five year period commencing with the fiscal year for which the
budget is being formulated (hereafter called 1973).
T2 :The five years following T1
T3 : The five year period following the end of T 2.
To summarize this classification scheme, with the exception of projects
assigned to Categories 21 and 22, all other projects will be identified with a single
system. Each system will in turn be assigned to a category and a time period.
9The task of defining systems should be made easier by referring to the
appropriate Development Concept Paper when one exists.
'IA precise definition of how a system is time period classifit'. deferred
until Chapter 3.
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D. MEASURING THE VALUE OF SYSTEMS WITHIN A CATEGORY
Having discussed the characteristics of value, we now turn to defining and
measuring it. The value of an R & D system will be loosely defined as a notional
(subjective) judgement made by an individual when he considers the capabilities
of the system for meeting a specific need (or set of needs). Since this judgement is
made in relation to the capabilities of other systems, it is often called relative
value.
Many methods have been devised for measuring these subjective value judge-
menths.1 In general they vary widely in the ease with which they can be applied.
One of the easiest to apply in terms of the time required is a "ranking-rating"
method. Briefly, a survey respondent is first asked to ordinally rank the systems
in order of importance. After this has been accomplished he is asked to assign a
number bewweten zero ard ten to the value of eacn system, where ten represents
the value of the system deemed most important. The assumption is then made
that these numbers represent an interval scale of measurement of the re!ative values
12of the systems. Due to the relative simplicity of this method, it will be the
one described in this paper. However the model can be used with value parameters
obtained from other methods, provided that they can be considered to be from an
interval scale of measurement.
Assume for the moment that, contrary to reality, the value of each of the
systemns within a category 13 and time period has a single attribute and the attribute
"
1 1Burington [ref. 61 discusses the merit* and shortcomings of some of the
methods that have been ipplied in the R & D context. Fishburn [ref. 7] reviews 24
different measurement methods that have appeared in the OR and Economic literature. A
12The implications of this assumption are discussed in Appendix A.
"
13The discussion of the value of systems within a category wil: .xclude Category
21, Maniagement and Sul,port, and Category 22, Basic Research. Ti e are treated
separately in Chapter 4.
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is definable in some unit of measure, W. It could then be said that the ith system in
th T
the ith category, a time period T system, has value during this period T of ViTj y W,
where y is some non-negative real number. If this were an industrial model, W
might be a dollar unit of measure and y the number of dollars, resulting in a
T
value such as Vii = 326 dollars. The fact that such a real numbered value like
326 dollars cannot be measured for military R & D systems will be shown to be
immaterial.
Suppose that a group of high-level DA planners, all experts in the systems of
the jth category, were surveyed and asked to ordinally rank the value of the time
period T systems of the jth category considering the following factors:
1. The performance characteristics of the resulting system will be exactly
as specified in its current DCP.
2. The system's development costs are immaterial.
3. The system's operational readiness date will be as specified in the DCP.
4. The system's procurement and operating costs are a significant consideration.
5. The threats these systems may have to face are also a significant
consideration.
Suppose further that, once an ordinal ranking was established, this same group
of experts could respond to a second survey asking them to rate the value of each
system on a scale of zero to ten, where the value of the moot important system is
taken to be ten. Assuming the response to this survey establishes an interval scale
of value, we then have a measure of the value of the ith system relative to the value
of the qth system, where the qth system is the one deemed most important.
Arbitrarily define this most important qth system as the time period numeraire.14
"
14The numeraire system is that system to which all the others re measured
relative to; the denominator of the ratios.
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We then have for each of the 20 categories and 3 time periods, a set oil real numbers
between zero and one;
VT
U for T -1, 2, 3
T
Vqj j 1l,...,20
where nj,T - the number of time period T systems in the jth category. For eiample,
for
j -3 Tank/Antitank
T= 1 Systems which are first available during the time frame 73-77.
i 2 Arbitrary assignment. Suppose it is "Antitank Gun Killer".






would imply that the consensus of the subjective value judgement of the group of
Tank/Antitank experts determined that the value of having Antitank Gun Killer
during the time frame 1973-77 was only 90 percent of the value of having the
MBT 70 tank.15
Once these parameters are established it is then desirable to get a measure ol
how the value of each system is degraded in time periods subsequent to the system's
introduction into the inventory, considering the most likely technological obsoles-
ence and enemy counter R & D moves. For example, the Tank/Antitank experts
2 3
might respond with time degradation factors of a1 ,3 f 0.66 and a1 ,3 - 0.1,
implying that the value the Army will achieve from MBT 70 during the time
frame 1978-82 is only two-thirds what it was in 1973-77, and during 1983-87,
only one-tenth of what it was in 1973-77.
15 How i consensus measure is reached i6 discussed later.
25
Oih; further set of data is required to make the value measurements within the
jth categojry commensdrate. The systems within a category were partitioned into
time periods to ease the problem of the survey respondents requirement to relate
systems' values being developed for different time frames. However they now must
be surveyed to relate the values of the most important systems from each period,
the time period numeraires. Let the time period I numeraire be the denominator
in these two measurements (now called the category numeraire) and measure the
values of T 2 and T3 numeraires relative to its value in those time periods. That
is measure;
2 3
Vqj and Vqj fr, j = 1 .... ,20
2 1 3 1
aqjVqj aqjVqj
The simple formula for relating the values of all systems within the j category
relative to its category numeraire is then,
T T Vv.. v. Q _T for i 1,...nj,T(1
1 T T1, 2, 3Vqj Vqj aqVqj j =1,. 20
alq. = 1
qJ
Before continuing the development of the model it may be beneficial at this
point to consider how such data might be obtained. One of the most widely
researched techniques is the Delphi Method developed by Dalkey of the Rand
Corporation [ref. 8]. It could be applied to this model in the following way.
Write a carefully worded survey that included a precise list of the factors the
respondents were to consider. Part of this list would be the performance character-
istics and other information from the DCP of each of the systems in this category.
Select at least ten respondent.; considered to be experts in the syst, .i of this
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category and issue them the survey individually. 16 Gather their responses and
record how each of them rated the relative values and time degradation factors.
Reissue the survey, but this time inclose the distribution of responses given for
the last survey, and ask the respondents to reconsider their initial reply. Also
ask that if they continue to rate a parameter outside the interquartile range of
the group distribution of responses, to add a brief comment why they did so.17
Reissue the survey again, inclosing the new distribution of responses and all the
anonymous comments, and ask for a final consideration. Dalkey has shown in
a number of tests of the Delphi Method that considerable convergence in responses
occurs after as few as three iterations of this controlled feedback technique.
Unfortunately there is no way of knowing whether or not it is converging to the
"true" parameter, some measure of the relation of the intrinsic values of the
systems.
Since the model will require a single measure to represent what is essentially a random
variable parameter, this paper will consider the mean of the distribution of responses to be
that measure, since in a statistical sense it represents the average of the responses. However,
for the sensitivity analysis on the parameters discussed in Chapter 4, the end point of the
interquartile range should also be recorded to provide the user with a feeling for the var-
iance of opinion of his expert advisors.
E. COMMENSURABILITY BETWEEN CATEGORIES
The data collection effort outlined in the last section resulted in commensurate
measures of value within each category, i.e., the value of the systems within the jth
category are measured on the interval scale of value of the category j numeraire
16 1n [ref. 81 Dalkey shows that the individual survey is preferred to a group
meeting survey in that it eliminates a possible bias caused by one or more dominant
personalities.
17 The interquartile range is that interval containing the middle 50 percent of
the responses
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!system. With this much information we could go on to Chapter 3 and continue the
development of the model, but it would necessarily result in sub-optimization,
since as yet there is no way of determining what the relative budget level for each
category should be. Therefore it is now necessery to devise methods for translating
the data developed thus far onto the value scale of a single RDTE program
numeraire system. Arbitrarily define the category 1 numeraire as the program
numeraire, and for simplicity of exposition, suppose it is the Cheyenne helicopter
which has value Vq,1.18
Two methods, a primary and a secondary method, are discussed for making
the value parameters of all systems commensurate. Each of them has various
advantages and disadvantages which will be pointed out.
The primary method calls for surveying a group of high-level DA planners and
asking them to rate the value of each of the category numcrairc systems on the
value scale of the program numeraire, Cheyenne (i.e., on a scale from zero to
perhaps 20 where the value of Cheyenne, Vqi, equals 10). This survey will result
in a set of parameters reflecting a consensus measure (as previously discussed) of the




The value of any system in the R & D program relative to the value of the program
numeraire is then:
V.. V.. VS. ij . jj for .i ... , nj (2)
Vq,1 Vqj Vq,1 j 1 .... , 20
'
18The time period superscripts T will be dropped from here u ince, after
using equation 1, we have no further use for time period classifying the systems.
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This method requires no mathematical assumptions, but presumes that each of the
survey respondents are thoroughly familiar with the development programs of each
of the category numeraire systems.
The secondary method requires the assumption that the value parsmeters
determined for the systems within a category be additive, i.e.,
Vij + Vkj ViJ + kj
VV qj Vqj
This assumption means, for example, that if the values of systems i and K were
rated at 1h the value of the category numeraire, then the value of having both the
i and k systems is the same as the value of having the numeraire system. 1 9
With the assumption of additivity of value the following simple equation can
be formulated.
Z Vijo V = Nj for j = 1,..., 20 (3)
where V*j represents the "slack vaiue" for calegory j, and Nj is a measure of
aggregated needs. In words Equation 3 says that the needs in this category equal
the sum of the values of all the systems being developed, minus some slack value.
While it is recognized that "needs" are really multi-dimensional, (i.e., in category
1 the Army has a need for both an attack helicopter and a surveillance helicopter)
it is felt that the concept of aggregated needs ir not an excessive abstraction since
in the ASOP it is currently assigned a priority. Vj* is included to cover two
possibilities. First, due to technological uncertainty in the systems being
developed, it is conceiveable that as a hedge against this uncertainty more
systems are being developed than are e:;pected to be required. In this case
"
19 Further implications of this assumption, as well a- methods 'r testing its
validity, are di.,cussed in Appendihx A.
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V * would be a positive quantity. Alternatively, intelligence on a recent R & D
breakthrough by a potential enen.-v may have suddenly increased Nj, and sufficient
time has not yet passed to reach the concept formulation stage for one or more
new systems. Here V* would be a negative quantity. Obtaining a measure o1 V;
might be accomplished in the following way. Again using the Delphi technique,
survey the category experts with questions similar to, "Assuming the development
of all systems proceeds as in their DCP's, what system could be droppcd from
the program?" If the consensus were the kth system, it would imply that
V Vkj
Vqj Vqj
Alternatively, the consensus might be that no system can be dropped, implying
that either the needs are exactly met or a gap between value and needs exists.
The value oi tnis negative slack might be deterniiacd by asking, "If in your opinion
a system has to be added to the program to meet the needs in this category, to
the value of which system currently in the program should the value of this new
system be equal?" If the consensus were the Ith system, then
V Vlj
Vqj Vqj
A very useful equation can result from taking the ratio of Equation 3 for two
different categories, in particular category 1 and category j, and applying some
algebraic manipulations.
V V1 N1
V j -N.i (4a)






Vqj _ Nj Vqj _. (4b1




substituting for the second term on the right in Equation 4b we get
Vi,1 V1
Vqj N j Vqi
S. . . .,(4)
Vq,1 N1  V iVj -4V
i V Vq1
qj qj
Note that all the terms in the bracket in Equation 4 have already been
determined. They are the values of the systems (or slack value) relative to their
category numeriares. The term on the left, the value of the category j numeraire
relative to the value of the program numeraire, is that quantity required for the use
of equal ion 2. The term
N.
NI
howev,ýr, is unknown. This represents the need during time period I for new
category j systems relative to the need for Air Mobility systems. Determining
these 19 parameters might also be done using the Delphi technique ith a group
of high level DA managers. As wa:. mentioned, it is currently dont .ai the ASOP
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on an ordinal scale for the first 14 Hardware Categories. The extension that this




in a manner similar to that used to find
vij
Vqj
F. AN ALTERNATE APPROACH TO MEASURING VALUE
In developing a useful, working model, trade-offs must be made between how
much information the model can provide the user in his decision problem and how
much effort is required in data collection. The approach outlined thus far already
requires a considerable data collection effort, and even more is asked for in the
next chapter. It should be pointed out that the parameters required to be obtained
by survey, arr for the most part, the same as those rneeded for RAC's model,
MEASURE I. This was purposely done to minimize the difference in the data
collection effort. It should also be noted, however, that how the data are used
to arrive at commensurate measures of relative value,
Vij
Vq,1
is considerably different for the two models. This point is discussed further in the
next section.
Chapter 5 of this paper outlines a management information system that might
be used to implement CARDBIOMB. Mention is made that the user as the
optioa to override any of the value parameters obtained thus far and insert his
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own relative values; in essence, disagreeing with his advisors. However, the approach
outlined in the last two sections gives him little insight into why the survey respondents
replied as they did. The following approach might provide more insight, but at
the cost of significantly increasing the data collection effort.
Recall that the value of a system and the need for it are both multi-attributed.
The primary approach requires a survey respordent to consider a vector of perfor.
mance characteristics as well as a vector of possible scenarios, weight the impoitance
of each characteristic and the likelihood of each scenario, and aggregate all these
factors in his head to arrive at a single measure of relative value. Hence a great
deal of information is not available to a user of the model should he wish to con-
sider altering the value parameters of one or more of the systems. Some of this
L-isight might be regained by using the following alternate 1pproach. Although
it is outlined only for obtaining the relative values of systems within a category
and time period, it could also apply to obtaining
V..Vqj NL
qjIVq,l1 o N1
(depending on which method, the primary or secondary, was used).
Survey the category j experts to obtain a list of what they consider the
significant performance characteristics of the systems in the jth category to be.
Label these k = 1, .. . m. Follow this with a survey to determine the relative
importance of each of these characteristics, relative, for example to k - 1. Label
these weighting factors as bk, where b, 1 . Again survey the categor, experts to
determine the value of each of 6ie systems relative to the vulue of the category




With the additivity assumption it could then by hypothesized that the value of the
ith system was equal to the sum of its value in achieving each performance
characteristic, weighted by the importance of the characteristic; i.e.,
InlVii - bk vi,k.
k-i
We would then have:
In Vik
Vij bki vk(5
v m vqk(5)qj kZ bk vqFk
m vi,k
ZI bk Vq,k
m for i=i,... = nj,T7 bk j= 1, .. .20
k=i
A simple example of this approach might help to clarify its use. Suppose the
three surveys mentioned above for category 1, Air Mobility, resulted in the following
set of data. Survey 1 determined that four important characteristics should be
considered for Air Mobility systems.
k - 1 Air speed
k - 2 Maneuverability
k - 3 Weapons accuracy
k - 4 PEMA and OMA costs
Survey 2 determined that, considering the future needs for air mobility systems,
the importance of each of these characteristics relative to air speed (determined
to be most important) were
b, - 1, b2 - 0.9, b3 - 9.8, b4 = 0.7
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Survey 3 resulted in the determination that the value of the design specifications and
costs for system 2 relative to the value of those for syztem 1, the category numeraire
were,
v2 ,1  v2,2  v2,3  v2 ,4
S0.59 - 1.2, 0.8, - = 1.3,
v11 v1,2 v1 ,3  V1 ,4
implying, for example that considering air speed alone, system 1 is twice as valuable
as system 2. Using Equation 5 to aggregate this data we would have,
V2 ,1  (1) (0.5) + (0.16) (1.2) + (0.8) (0.8) + (0.7) (1.3)
S 1= 0.9 (to theV1,1  1 + 0.9 + O.r + 0.7 nearest tenth)
Because of the additional data collection effort that would be required, this
approach is considered by the author to be inappropriate for this model. Discussion
of it has been included in this paper primarily to indicate a limitation to the
approach dizzusscd in the previous two sections the limitation of the lack of
insight provided the user in understanding the factors that were considered in
aniving at the reltive value and relative category needs parameters. This limitation
might be partly overcome by having the survey respondents submit a brief
paragraph on why they decided on the responses they gave. These might be
summarized in a short paper for each system and referred to by the user when he
is considering whether or not he agrees with a particular parameter.
G. COMMENTS ON THE MEASUREMENT OF VALUE
Section B of this chapter outlined obstacles to the effective measurement of
value for R & D systems. It should be apparent that the value measurement
portion of this model has dealt with these problems in various ways. In this
section each of these obstacles is recalled in order to provide the re:; !er with more
information on %Nhich to judge the validity of the methods used.
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Lack of a unit of measure. Recall that it was assumed that a unit of measure,
W, existed, and that the value uf each system could be measured as having some




and the result is some dimensionless real number like 0.8. When a program
numeraire (the denominator of all the ratios) is selected, it can then be said
that the value of all the systems are measured on the value scale of this
numeraire. For example
V.j j = 0.8
Vq,1
is equivalent to Vij= 0.8 Vql, implying that whatcvwr real number is selected to
represent Vq,1 , Vij must always be 0.8 of that number.
The subjective nature of value. In any analytical study there is a natural aversion
to using subjective valve judgements as important parameters. Nonetheless, very
few decision problems exist where they are not required to be made. Regardless
of the pains to which a decision maker may go to collect "objective facts" bearing
on the problem, he ultimately must subjectively weigh these facts when faced with
a tradeoff decision. This model assists him by presenting him with a consensus
measure of the subjective value judgements of his advisors, but allowing him to
override their advice and use his own judgement,..
The aggregation of subjective value judgements. Regardless of tne amount of
objective information available to a group of experts, when they apply their own
judgements it is unlikely that they will exactly agree. The Delphi MI !hod for
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aggregating their advice is used in this model because it represents the extent of
the state of the art in what might be called "opinion technology." To keep the
model reasonably sim,,)le, a single measure of value, the mean of their responses,
is used. However the decision maker has the right, indeed the need, to know the
extent of the disagreement of his advisors. Hence the end points of the interquartile
range of their distribution of responses will be recorded as a measure of the variance
of their opinion.
The non-commensurable nature of value. The model provides for partitioning
the systems of the RDTE program, first into categories of systems which perform
similar missions and then into time periods. After value judgements are made or,
these reasonably commensurate subsets, mathematically consistent methods are
applied to relate the value of each system to the value scale of the "program
numcraire.2 0 It was stated earlier that these nm~ahematical methods are considerably
different in this model and MEASURE I. RAC's model provides for the weighting
of the relative value parameter within the jth category by multiplying it by the




This produces a different result than that obtained by using Equations 2 and 4, as
the following simple example demonstrates.
Assume a two category program with two systems per category where there
exists absolute measures of value and need that are known with certainty as follows.
20 Besides idtlntifying reasonably commensurate subsets, the p:i 'ioning helps
to eliminate bias. A proponent of .\ir Mobility does not rate the ( enne
relative to MFBT 70.
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Category 1 V1 ,1 = 20
V2 ,1 = 10
N, - 25, implying V1 = 20 + 10 - 25 = 5
Category 2 V1 ,2 = 15
V2 ,2 = 10
N2 = 20, implying V2 = 15 + 10 - 20 = 5
Although it is apparent that
V2 ,2  10
V1,1  20
let us attempt to verify this using the methods of both models. Equation 4
results in;
F20 10 5
V1 2  20 20 20 20 _ 15
Vl 2r5 15 10 5 20
V 1 1 +- -I
15 15 15
and using this in Equation 2 yields;
V22 .0 15 10 , in agreement with me data.
V1l 15 20 20
The MEASURE I method would result in,
V22  V2 2  N2  10 20 8
not in agreement with the data.
V11  V1 2  N1  15 25 15
This inconsistency is not the result of incorporating the concept of slack value.
Even assumig VI and V* are zero, implying N1  30 and N2  25, the RAC
method results in
b8
V2 2  10 25 5 10 21
Vl 1  15 30 9 20
The multi.attributed nature of value. This point was discussed at length in
Section F where an alternate approach to measuring value was outlined. The
principal approach require- the survey respondent to consider multiple attributes,
but reduce them to a single measure of relative value. As mentioned, significant
information may be lost to the user of the model when he desires to question the
validity of a value parameter.
Value as a function of time. The model requires that the category experts
estimate value degradation parameters reflecting the pe'cent of the initial value
remaining in time periods subsequent to the time period when the system is
expected to be operational. Although five year time periods were defined, this
is completely arbitrary.
Scenario risk. This becomes a factor for consideration by the survey respondents,
and thus is not made visible in the model. The respondent must consider how the
systems would perform in various circumstances, and then apply his own judgement
concerning the likelihood of these scenarios. Thus, if all other factors were equal)
if he considered a counterinsurgency war more likely than a major NATO encounter,
the system designed for the former would have more value to him than one designed
for the latter.
Cost uncertainty. Except as this factor might be considered by a survey
respondent, this important consideration is not included in the model. This
applies also to indirect objectives, e.g., effects on the R & D community, political,
2iThis diwcus•;ion is not to imply that this is the only differenct in the valuc
determination methoJs of the two models.
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etc. Chapter 5 does outline, however, how sensitivity analysis can be conducted on
cost parameters.
Technological uncertainty. Recall that the value determination surveys
directed the respondent to assume that performance characteristics and operational
readiness dates would be exactly as projected in the current DCP's. Thus value
was measured independent of technological uncertainties. The next chapter
introduces how the technological factors are considered.
The interdependence of systems' values. It would be unreasonable to require
the Air Mobility experts to envision a future where the Army operated with only
one system from this category. Therefore the value parameters have a certain
degree of interdependence. Yet the mathematical formulation of the model will
require that these values be assumed independent. This inconsistency has important
implications concerning the solutions the model generates, particularly with regard
to the usefulness of the mode. in providing insight into which systems might be
dropped from the program. Discussion of these implications is deferred until
Chapter 4.
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HI. RELATING VALUE TO COST
The development of the model has thus far dealt solely with methods for
determining commensurate measures of value for the RDTE systems. The reader
may have already formed an opinion concerning the usefulness and validity of
those methods. Should the concepts developed in the prei ious chapter be rejected,
the remainder of the model car, still be useful, providing that; (1) some method
is used to arrive at commensurate measures of value of the systems as currently
planned, and (2) some measure of how that value changes over time is determined.
Recall that in the previous chapter, survey respondents were directed to
disregard RDTE costs and technological uncertainty in determining the value
parameters. We now turn to a consideration of these two factors in order to
arrive at an intermediate goal - determining how the value a system is expected
to achieve varies with RDTE dollar costs.
A. SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON COST
Costs are incurred in the implementation of the RDTE program for a number
of resources, e.g., manpower, materiel, facilities and dollars. At some point in
time any one of these resources might be a constraint on the program. However,
since this is a budget model, it considers only the input of dollars. A still more
restrictive definition of the costs considered must be used, however. To achieve
the value determined in the last chapter, a system must be developed, produced
and operated over its uselful life. It would then appear obvious that the relevant
cost considerations should be the total RDTE, PEMA and OMA cost ows,
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appropriately discounted. 2 2 For models specifically pertaining to project selection,
i.e., those dealing only with the decision of which systems should be in the program,
all of these dollar costs must be considered. However, since this model is designed
to Investigate RDTE budget alternatives, oniy RDTE dollar costs are considered
directly. Reca.A, though, that survey respondents were directed to consider PEMA
and OMA costs in th, , determination of value. 2 3 To avoid ambiguity the term
"d~cost" as used in the remainder of this paper will refer to the total RDTE dollar
cost for a system unless otherwise specified.
B. EXPECTED VALUE OVER TIME FOR A FIXED BUDGET
What does an incremental change in the RDTE budget of a system buy in
terms of value? Investigation of this question is an important step in determining
how value varies with cost.
First, if the performance characteristics (and thus, probably the value) are
upgraded, an increase in cost is likely to result. Similarly increasing the budget
may allow the value to increase, either from an upgrade in the performance character-
istics or a reduction in uncertainty that the characteristics, as planned, will be
achieved.
A second way that value might vary with cost is in the time that is likely to
be required in the development program before the system reaches operational
readiness. An increase in the budget could possibly cause a shortening of the
development time, while a reduction might require that the program be stretched.
2 2While discounted coats are the appropriate consideration, discounting will
be disregarded in the remainder of the text. It could be easily incorporated into
the model.
231t is shown later that considering only RDTE costs, rather th i total systems
cost, will further restrict the use of this model in aisisting with what might be called
the ADD/DROP decision.
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To determine how the value of each system varies with RDTE costs, it is
necessary to gather more data from individuals intimately connected with the
development of the system. To do this we might survey program managers with
the following type questions.2 4
You are the program manager for System 127, Kickapoo helicopter. System
127 is composed of the following projects with a base case RDTE funding schedule
as shown.
Project FY Budget (in Millions)
Number Description 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
112 Platform Engr Dev 30 30 30
163 Platform Adv Dev 50 50 50
176 Engine Engr Dev 10 10
193 Engine Adv Dcv 10 10
403 Wpn Sys Dev 20 20 20
519 Test and Eval 5
Total Annual Cost: 40 40 40 80 70 70 5
Total RDTE Base Funding Cost: 345
Question 1. What are the earliest, latest, and most likely operational readiness dates
(ORD) at this base funding schedule?
Question 2. Consider a total RDTh Funding level ten percent greater than base.
How would you recommend using these funds to change performance characteristics
and/or ORD? 2 5 Record these new characteristics and the earliest, latest and most
likely ORD. Also record the rew funding schedule.
2 4 Each major hardware system has a program manager. For systems defined
in Non-Hardware Categories, it is presumed that someone has the necessary famil-
iarity to respond to such a survey.
2 5 Note that the program manager is asked to give his opinion f what might
be called the technically feasible and optimal trade-off of performn,1 characteristics
for ORD. It is prP.Sumed that his knowledge of the i chnological i :,rtainty
leads to a feasible trade-Lff. Whether or not it is the "best" tradeoif is a matter to
be carefully ;tudied by users of the model.
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Question 3. Answer question 2, but consider a total funding level 20 percent above
base.2 6
Question 4. At what total RDTE funding level would the Army be better off
dropping this development program?
Question 5. Letting Y be your answer to question 4, consider a funding level equal
to Y + 1/3(345 - Y). Answer question 2 at this funding level.
Question 6. Consider a funding level of Y + 2/3(345 - Y). Answer question 2 with
the total budget constrained at this level.
Note that question 4 identifies a "disaster funding level," At or below which
the program manager feels the Army is better off dropping the system. The other
questions are designed to collect information on value changes and readiness date
changes for five funding levels above disaster, two on the high and two on the lo%
side of the base case funding level.
Note also that for any of the four levels above disaster (excluding the base
case) for which the program manager identified significant chaiges in performance
characteristics, it would be necessary to treat the system as a new system and
re.survey the category managers for different value parameters.
Determining the earliest, most likely anu latest operational re:idiness dates is
a technique from PERT theory used to construct a probability of completion
distribution over time. The three parameters are usually used to construct a Beta
probability distribution. For the purposes of this model, however, a simple linear
cumulative distribution function will be defined as shovn in Figure 1, where P(t)
represents the probability that the system is in in operational readiness state in
26The earliest ORD answer to this question defines to which t; e period the
system belongs.
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Figure 1. CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY OF
OPERATIONAL READINESS OVEP TIME
The one final set of data required for the model is indirectly a measure of
its useful life. This data might be obtined by again sitrveying the category
managers with a question V!ke, "what is the earliest, most likely and latest years
you would expect this system to be retiied from the operational inventory?"
Since it is poss; 1het this probability distribution of retirement time is related
to the operat;oda1 readiness daue (and therefore to the funding level), this question
should probably be asked for nach funding level and conditioned on the distribution
of the operational r•adin ss date for that level.
We now have reached the point where enough information is available to
constz•rct an expected value versus time curve for the i, ith system funded at
level f, where:
f 1 Funding level Y, "clisaster funding"
f 2 Y - 1,3 (Base - Y)
f =3 Y + 2/3 (Base- Y)
f 4 Base case funding
€ 5 Te. percent above base ':ase
f = 6 Tweaty percent above base case
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In Figure 2, the highest curve, encompassing both dashed and solid line segments,
rep-..sents the value of a system when. availability is not ccnsidered. It is constructed
Si i
using a linear interpolation between the value degradation points determined in the
I
category managers' survey. The solid curve, the expected value of the system, is
the product of the value of the system in year t times the probability the system is
operational in year t.
For each system a curve similar to Figure 2 wouild be defined for each of
funding levels 2 through 6. They may differ for each funding level in one of the
following ways.
1. If L:-- nerformance characteristics changed and resulted in a change in
the value parameter for the system, the highest curve (value curve ) will
be shifted up or down
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2. Different distributions of the probability of entry and exit times will
undoubtedly occur, causing a shift of the expected value curve in the
uncertain region (the years where the probability of availability is less
than 1) to the right or left.
C. THE TRANSFORMMTION TO AN EXPECTED VALUE VERSUS COST CURVE
Since a curve similar to Figure 2 can be constructed for each system i for each
of five different funding levels f, a method is available for plotting how the total life
expected value varies with total HRDTE funds. Define the total life expected value of
the ith system when funded at level f as follows:
27
t'u
TVif E [Vi (6)
where t" = max [tý (the optimistic retirement year))
i -
For each system, apply Equation 6 for each of the five funding levels above disaster
funding. A curve similar to Figure 3 will result.
TVi
T i..... . . . . .. .. .. .... -.
I IT Vi,3
1 2 3 4 5 6
Base Funding
Figure 3. TOTAL LIFE EXPECTED VALUE VERSUS TOTAL RDTE COST CURVE
2 7 Fjr simplicity of notation the category subscript j will 1)e dr( tped. The
second sUbscript f will be used to denote which of tht' 6 funding h., V is being
referred to.
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An attempt might be made to fit an analytical curve between the data points,
but it is doubtful that much would be gained, and it would result in a difficult
problem to solve for an optimum.
Although Figure 3 shows total life expected value to be a simple function of
total RDTE cost, actually it is quite complex. Incorporated in it is information
concerning the system's value relative to all others in the program, its expected
useful life, technological uncertainty and all the other factors that have been con-
sidered up to this point.
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Note might be taken of the shape of the curve. In the cost range [0, f = 6],
or zero to 20 percent above base, it has a characteristic "S-shape", reflecting no
value achieved until a certain "buy-in" cost is paid. In the cost range [f = 1, f 6],
value is shown to be an increasing function with cost, although increasing at a
diminishing rate. The curve is said to be conca,- in the region [f = 1, f = 61. Until
such time as actual data is collected, there is no way of knowing for sure that such
a curve will result for each of the systems. To assume that the curve is concave over
the region of positive value is to accept the widely used assumption from economic
theory of diminishing marginal returns. Simply stated this says that as funds are
increased, a dollar buys more value, but not as much more as the dollar before it
bought.
28 Appendix A lists more precisely how all the variabhs are fi. -tionally
related to TVi.
48
IV. FORMULATING MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMS FOR
THE SIX DECISION PROBLEMS
Thus far the discussion has dealt primarily with defining the problem and
gathering input data for the construction of total life expected value versus cost
curves for each system in the program. In this chapter the discussion centers on
how this information is used in mathematical programs to provide the decision
maker with insight into selecting the "right" combination of the six options he
has for altering the RDTE budget.
A. ALTERNATIVE TIME PREFERENCE STRATEGIES
Suppose international tensions had reached the state where it was increasingly
apparent that World War III was likely to begin in the near future. Certainly the
Army's R & D effort would emphasize concentration on near-term systems to the
detriment of those planned for operational readiness much further in the future.
Conversely, in a world situation where war .seemed highly unlikely in the near futare,
the "best" sLrategy might be to concentrate the R & D effort on the later systems,
gambling that the resources saved by a de-emphasis on near-term systems could be
better spent on those being developed for the out years. Lacking certain knowledge
of the future, there is no "best" strategy; nor should the anL.. t try to impose
one. This is a strategy decision of great importance that should be made only at
the highest levels.
Recall that a time period 1 system was selected as the category numeraire for
each category, and that systems from later time periods were related to it using
the time degraded value of the numeraire. In essence, then, all systtins are measured
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in what might be called present value. This was purposely done to allow for the
input of alternative strategies. Loosely define three different strategies in the
following manner.
Short range strategy: Relatively more emphasis is placed on achieving value in
the near term.
Neutral strategy: The importance of achieving value is equal in all time periods.
Long range strategy: Relatively more emphasis is placed on achieving value in
the out years.
Any of Lhese strategies cain be incorporated ito the model in the following
way. Ask the user to assign the number 1 to the time period he wishes to emphasize
the most. Then assign fractional numbers to the other periods indicating their
importance relative to the most important one. For example, parameters for a short
range strategy might be (1, 3/4, 1/2), indicating that the user values operational
systems twice as much in period 1 as in period 3. Similarly, parameters for a long
range strategy might be (8/10, 9/10, 1), and for a neutral strategy (1, 1, 1).
Strategies can be incorporated into the model by using a time preference
param,.ter, dt, defined as shown in Figure 4 (for a short range stratc,.,y). Note that
a constant rate of change of time oreference is assumed, as well as a constant time
preference for the years not, between the data points. Once the user ideiitifies
Wte three parameters reflecting the strategy he wants to investigate, dt is defined
for each year t. The expected value curves are then modified to reflect the importance
the user places on ope':ational systems in any year by multiplying the expected







77 82 87 t
Figure 4. TIME PREFERENCE PARAMETER
The impact of inserting a time preference strategy can be seen in Figure 5.
The solid curves represent the expected value as determined in the last chapter.
They also represent a neutral (1, 1, 1) strategy. The dashed curves represent a
short range (1, ;./4, 1/2) strategy, while the dotted curves are a (1/2, 3/4, 1) long
range strategy. Naturally, since strategies alter the expected value curves, the
total life expected value versus cost curves will also be changed.
Besides the obvious partiality for systems of a particular time period that
results from selecting a strategy, strategies also cause changes in the relative import-
mice of certain variables. For example, a short range strategy would lessen the
advantage of a long life system, while a long range strategy lessens the importance
of an earlier operational readiness date in a time period 1 system. All of these
factors are incorporated into the model by the simple multiplication of dt E[Vi]
B. DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL PROGRAM FOR A GIVEN STRATEGY
AND BUDGET
Once a strategy has been selected by the user, a specific TVi versus cost
curve is identified for each system. Suppose the user wishes to use (\RDBOMB
to determine an optimal RDTE program for a given total RDTE but.,,et constraint
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Figure 5. IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE TIME STRATE:GIES
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for FY 73 of B billion dollars.2 9 He desires that this be determined without con-
sidering dropping or slipping any of the systems currently in the base case program.
3 0
Since dropping a system is not to be considered, attention can be directed to the
TVi curves in the cost range above f = 1, the disaster funding level. That is,
only funding levels 2 through 6 are to be considered feasible alternatives for each
system. With the assumption that the values of the systems are independent of




Subject to: Cif,73! B73
where xi = the total RDTE cost of the ith system
C th yer tcostof he thCi,f,t = the year t cost of the i system when funded at level f.
Unfortunately (in a mathematical sense) the budget constraint is on the FY 73
costs and no;t on the total RDTE costs. While it may be likely that the TVi(xi)
curves are concave, it is possible that some of the TVi versus year t costs are not.
As an illustration consider the two curves in Figure 6,
The right curve illustrates the case where year t costs as estin)-ted by the
program manager are higher at funding level 3 than they are at f = 4, certainly
a possibility for some systems. Solving for an optimal solution when the curves
29 B billion would represent the total funds allocated to RDTE minus the
amount required for the categories of Basic Research and Management and Support.
These are still being excluded from the discussion. Although the fir t year is being
used as the budget year under investigation, the model can also be ti•ed to investi-
gate constraints in years other than this first year. Discussion of this point is
deferrod until Chapter 5.
30These two decision options are discussed in Sections D and
3 1 The implications of this aSumption are diisCsIctl irl Sect it of this chapter
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in the objective function are not concave can be a difficult task involving complex
search procedures. However the following simple algorithm (solution method) will
lead to an approximation to the optimal solution. 3 2
Algorithm 1
1. Calculate and label the slopes of the four linear segments of the TVi versus
total RDTE cost curve above funding level f = 2 as (i, s), for i = 1 .... , n
systems and s = 1, .... ,4 slopes. These slopes are measures of marginal
value between the funding levels.
2. Order these 4 n slopes in decreasing sequence, K = 1, . . . , 4n.
3. Calculate the initial value of a running sum
n
Rt o Ci, 2 ,7 3
i=1
the totn! FY 73 cost of the program when all systems are funded at
f= 2. SetK= 1.
4. Identify the ith system belonging to slope K. Calculate Ql(, the increase
in FY 73 costs for this system when it is funded one level higher.
=K Q Ci,f+1,73 - Ci,f,73"
5. IfRK. 1 +QK > B, goto step8.
6. If RK1 + QK !" B set RK RK-11I + QK and raise the funding level of
the ith system to f = f + 1.
7. Set K - K + 1 and return to Step 4.
8. Stop. An approximation to the optimum has been reachc
321iow close this approximimtion is to the optimum k di:;cu..,., Appendix A,
as well as more elaborate procedures for finding the actual optimum.
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______
A simple example of this algorithm may help to clarify its use. Suppose the
RDTE program consisted of two systems whose total value versus cost curves were
as shown below. Additionally, the program managers for these two systems had
estimated the total FY 73 funding for each of funding levels 2 through 6 to be:
Funding Level
"_ 3 4 5 6
System 5 30 35 40 45
2 60 70 80 90 100
TV1  TV 2








70 00 90 100 110 120 170 180 190 200 210 220
The slope ordering list called for in step 2 of the algorithm is reflected in the
third column of the "Budget Incrementing Matrix" shown in Figure 7. Note
R0 - 25 + 60 = 85. If the budget constraint being investigated were B = 115,
the algorithm would stop at K = 4, reflecting both systems funded at their base
funding levels. The total value accruing to the program would be 20 + 19 = 39.
FY 73
System f Marginal Funds RValue Added
K = 1 1 3 0.7 30-25 90
2 2 3 0.6 70-60 100
.3 1 4 0.5 0 35-30 105
4 2 4 0.4 80-70 115
5 1 5 0.3 40-35 120
6 2 5 0.2 90-80 130
7 1 6 0.15 45-40 135
8 2 6 0.1 100-90 145
Figure 7. BUDGET INCREMENTING MATRIX
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As has been mentioned, once a strategy has been selected a TVi versus cost
curve is identified for each system. Additionally, a budget incrementing matrix
is defined. If a user wished to investigate some alternative RDTE budget level
for FY 73, the recommended changes from the base case are clearly visible in
the Budget Incrementing Matrix. For example if he wished to investigate a con-
straint of B = 135, the model would recommend he consider raising system 1 to
f = 6 and system 2 to f = 5.
Studying Figure 7 should make the need for the assumption of coricave curves
apparent. If at sonme point, diminishing marginal value was not the case for a
particular system, then the slope sequence list might, for example, call for an
increase to f = 5 before f r 4 was achieved. For systems that might exhibit a
"violation" to the law of diminishing marginal value, the following procedure can
be applied as a modification to Algorithm 1. Consider a system whole TVi versus
cost curve is as shown in Figure 8. For some reason little increase in value is
Figure 8. NON-CONCAVE VALUE CURVE
achieved in going from f - 3 to f - 4 (marginal value near zero). The dotted line
between f - 3 and f - 5 does represent the marginal value between t',ese doints,
however. The approximation to the optimal solution culA le ot.' d by using
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the slope of this interpolated line in Algorithm 1. If it resulted in f = 2, 3 or 6
being recommended for this system, the non-concave portion of the curve had no
impact. Iff = 5 were selected, however, it would be necessary to check whether
or not reducing this system to f = 4 would free funds to be spent on another
system which would result in greater program value.
C. TESTING THE SOLUTION AGAINST THE BASE CASE PROGRAM
Suppose Algorithm 1 were used with an FY 73 budget constraint equal to that
planned for the base case program. Undoubtedly a solution other than the base
case would result. i.e., some systems would be funded higher than base funding
(f = 4) and some would be lower. This could result from kny of the following
reasons.
1. The time preference paramete. - use;' did not adequaLely reflect the
actual time preferences of the collective leadership of DA.
2. Some of the value, need, useful life or other parameters, all consensus
measures determined by advisors or program managers, do not reflect
the views of the decision makers.
3. The base case program contains inefficiencies, i.e., after more careful
analysis, a better program might result if funds were taken from some
systems and given to others.
4. The approximation to the optimal solution determined by Alogrithm 1
was not close to opti,..ý
5. Some combination of two or more of the above reasons.
Resolving the differences between the solution as determined by the algorithm
and the the actual base case program would be a difficult but useful exercise.
First, it might identify inefficiencies in the actual base case, suggesting a better
distribution of funds. Second, if the model is to be of any use at all in investigating
alternative budget constraints, the parameters need to reflect a gene, I agreement
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on their validity. An investigation ef the divrgence of the solution and the base
case might take the fohowing form.
First an attempt to resolve the time preference parameters to see if some
plrticular set comes closest to producing a solution similar tc the base case. For
exmunple, £tartirg with ai neutral strategy (1, 1, 1), move increasingly in the direction
of a short ran•,,e strategy.33 The criteria for a set of strategy parameters being more
suitable than another could be the number of systems funded at levels other than
base funding. As an example, suppose this investigation resulted in the following.
Time Preference Number of Systems
Parameters Not at f = 4, Base Funding Level
(1, 1, 1) 25
(1, .95, .9) 20
(1, .9. .85) 15
(1, .85, .80) 5
(1, .8, .7) 10
(i, .7, .6) 20
It might then be assumed that (1, 0.85, 0.8) most closely reflect the time preference
of DA decision makers. Of course there is no way to prove that these parameters
are "correct", but thaey do imply that DA decision makers have acted as if these
were their time preferences.
The investigation might then continue with a careful analysis of 'he systems
not at funding level 4. This investigation might result in agreement that the responses
to the surveys were unrealistic in some cases and some of the input parameters need
adjusting. Alternatively it might be agreed that the base case would indeed be
better if some redistribution of fund;s were made.
33 Due to the nature of national defense, defense decision makers are generally
presumed to prefer forces in being to systems planned for further in the future.
Starting the investigation from a neutral strategy and moving toward strategies
which are more and more short range should mir.imize twe number sets of
parameters required for this investigation.
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D. IDENTIFYING SYSTEMS TO BE SLIPPED
The last two sections dealt with the pro,3lem of determining an optimal RDTE
program for a given fiscal year budget constraint. The method formulated assumed
tha6 the user did riot wish to consider slipping a system's development schedule
one or more years. As has been stated, slipping consist3 of delaying the start of
a development program, or interrupting one that has already begun (such as between
the engineering development and advanced development stages with the intent of
starting it up again at a later date). This, of course, is a decision option open to
the Army for altering the RDTE budget program for -ny given year. We now
consider how the model can assist the usei in identifying systems which might be
slipped one or more years.
The first consideration that must be addressed is whicki systems might
reasonably be considered for slipping. Certainly if one or more of the projects
of a system scheduled for FY 73 are "carry.overs" from FY 72, it might be
unreasonable to expect that it would be economical to interrupt work on those
projects for one or more years and then begin them again. This fact alone will
undoubtedly eliminate many systemc from consideration for slippinlg.
One must also consider what might be gained or lost from slipping the
schedules of systems. The first "gain" might be called a reduction in technological
uncertainty. The development cycles of systems follow a general sequential pattern
starting with the concept development stag, and progressing through engineering
development, advanced development, test and evaluation, auid finally, production
and operational systems develcpment. Between each of these stages of development
a detailed review of the progress that has been achieved must be ma•e and a
decision issued on whether or not to begin the next stage. It migit determined(
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that, in order to overcome technical problems which have not been resolved, the
best course of action is to slip the next stage one or more years. The decision
problem associated with slipping a system's development schedule to over-ome
technical difficulties is not addressed in this model. It is assumed that these decisions
have already been made in arriving at the base case program.
Besides reducing technological uncertainty, the Army might also wish to
consider slipping the development schedule of one or more systems to save funds
in a particular year. The model can assist with this decision option by identifying
a measure of the value iost per dollar saved when a system is slipped.
Suppose that for a particular time strategy and total budget constraint,
Algorithm 1 resulted in funding level f being optimal for the ith "system. The
expected value versus time curve for this system at this funding level might be as






Figure 9. LOSS IN VALUE, Li, CAUSED BY ., ONE YEAR SLIP
the probability that a system is operationai by year t is affected by a one-year
schedule slip only to the extent that it is displaced one year, and (2) the probability
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distribution of the system retirement date is not affected by a one-year slip,3 4 then
the loss in value, Li, caused by a one-year slip to the development schedule of the
ith system can be approximated by;
E[V]it + ELV]it+l (7)Lif2(7
2
Dividing Li by the FY 73 budget for the ith system Ci,f, 73 , would then determine
an approximation to the loss in value per dollar saved by a one-yy'ar slip. This j
presumes that no money would be required to keep the program "alive" during the
slip. If this were not the case, Ci,f,73 would represent the difference.
If a user of the model wished to consider slipping as an alternative for
investigating different RDTE programs, this could be incorporated in the following
way.
Algorithm 2
1. Use Algorithm 1 to determine the approximation to the optimal RDTE
funding level f for each system when slipping is not considered.
2. For the subset of systemq identified as candidates for slipping, calculate
LL Li
Ci,f,73
the loss in value per FY 73 dollar saved.
3. Order the set of [silk in increasing sequence K = 1, . . , n. (The system
with the smallest loss in value per dollar saved is first in this sequence,
k - 1). Set k 1.
4. Identify the kth system as the next system in the budget incrementing
matrix to be increased if more FY 73 funds were available. Calculate
Salternative to these assumptions would be to gather more lata on how
a one year slip would affect the earliest, latest, and most likely oper. ional readiness





the gain in total value to the kth system per FY 73 dollar added.
5. If Sik • Gk (if the loss in total value caused by slipping system i one
year is greater than the gain in total value to system k when the money
saved by the slip is transfered to system k), go to step 8.
6. If Si,k < Gk, slip system i one year and transfer the savings to system k.
7. Let k - k + 1 and return to Step 4.
8. Stop. Slipping any more systems and transferring the funds to other
systems will only cause a net decrease in the total value of the RDTE
program.
E. IDENTIFYING WHICH SYSTEMS MIGHT BE DROPPED
Another alternative for altering the RDTE program is to drop one or more
systems. As has been mentioned, this decision problem is normally addressed on
a system by system basis during the extensive progi "- review following completion
of a stage of the development cycle, or when some threshold parameter of the DCP
has been violated. It could also be addressed on a total program basis, i.e., given
a particular FY 73 budget constraint, would more total value iccrue to tl. RDTE
program if one or more systems were dropped ard the savings transf'orred to other
systems? It has previously been stated that CARDBOMB can only indirectly assist
in this decision problem for reasons which can be summarized as follows.
The interdependence of the value parameters. As has been mentioned, the
relative value of the ith system is a consensus measure of a group of experts who
were not asked to envision a future where the ith system was the only one in the
inventory. In other words, the value or this system depends on the value which
results in other systems. The optimization procedure discussed thu, -r has ignored
this interdependence and assumed that the value achieved by one sysItem does not
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alter the value of another. This independence of value assumption says, for example,
that the change in expected operational readiness date and performance characteristics
caused by a change in the funding level of the ith system in no way affects the value
of other systems. For changes in value in the region around the base case funding
level, i.e., plus or minus 20 percent of base funding, this assumption is probably not
a bad approx:mation for most systems. This situation will undoubtedly not be the
case when dropping a system is considered. While moving up the operational
readiness date of Tank System A orne year probably does not significantly affect
the value of Tank System B, dropping System A would undoubtedly have a
significant impact on the value of System B. Models have been developed which
take into consideration the interdependence of value. 3 5 In general they would
require a far greater data collection effort and complex dynamic programming
solution rmcthods.
The interdependence of value and total system's cost. The surveys to determine
the value parameters asked the respondents to consider PEMA and OMA costs in
arriving at a measure of a system's value. If all other considerations were equal,
a system with high PEMA and OMA costs would be rated lower than a cheaper
system This technique was used to insure that these important cost considerations
were included in the model, but not on the cost axis of the TVi versus cost curves,
since the model is designed primarily for investigating only the RDTE budget. In
eddressing the problem of which, if any, systems could be dropped, the appropriate
measure would be the total value (measured independent of all cost) per total
system's cost dollar.
3 5See Weingartner fref. 91 for a survey of these models.
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Keeping in mind these considerations, CARDBOMB still might provide insight
into the decision problem of which systems might be dropped. Using the total
life expected value for the ith system determined using algorithms 1 and 2, divide
this by the total expected system's cost. That is, for each system i, calculate
0
TV~Di =




TVi -- total life expected vplue at the optimal funding level.
xi = total RDTE cost at the optimal funding level
Yi = total PEMA cost.
zi = annual OMA cost.
p,. = as before, the probability the system is operational in year t.
Ordering the set of Di in increasing sequence, while certainly not establishing a
priority list for dropping systems, could assist the Army by focusing attention on
which development programs might be more carefully analyzed. The first system
in the list wouid be the one with the lcwest average value, or value per total dollar.
F. ANALYZING THE IMPACT ON THE TOTAL PROGRAM OF ADDING
A NEW SYSTEM
By the time a new system has finished the concept development stage,
considerable cost-effectiveness analysis has been conducted on alternative approaches
to meeting the threat for which it is designed. Besides these analyses a necessary
input to the DCP is the impact the introduction of this system will have on other
Army programs, i.e., what must be given up to get it.
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As was the case in the question of which systems might be dropped, CARDBOMB
is limited in assisting with this problem for much the same reasons - the inter-
dependence of the value parameters and the treatmert of PEMA and OMA costs as
negative value rather than independent variables. However insight to this problem still
might be gained in the following way.





a measure of the value of this new ith system on the same scale as all the other
systems.36 Similarly, gather data for four alternative funding levels to arrive at
a TVi versus RDTE cost curve. Include this new curve in the program and, using
Algorithm 2 and the same total budget constraint, solve for an optimal solution.
This new solution will determine two things. First, it will recommend at which of
the five funding levels this system ought to be developed, and second, the impact
on the systems whose funding levels had to be lowered determine a measure of
what must be sacrificed in the RDTE program to get this system. That is,
introducing System Z into the program might require reducing the design character-
istics of System Y and stretching the operational readiness date of System W one
year. Alternatively, the Army might decide to maintain the design characteristics
of System Y, mire the RDTE budget constraint and make up the difference in some
other budget program. In any event CARDbOMB has assisted by identifying in
terms other than dollars, what must be given up to get System Z.
3 6 A way of avoiding the interdependence of valut problem in s case is to 4
survey to detertnine new relative value parameters for all the s'yv'., n this
category when the new systen, is considered ;art o. this category.
Of cow-se these measures of what must be given up only consider the RDTE
budget. Lacking an optimization model which encompasses the RDTE, PEMA and
OMA budgets, we must resort to the average value methods of the previous Section.
Therefore, besides conducting the analysis just discussed, it might also be appropriate
to determine where the Di for this system, the total value per total systems dollar,
fits into the sequence of Di discussed in the previous section. If it turned out to
be high on the list, meaning it has one of the lower average values in the program,
this could imply that it r.tight not be worth the cost and should be studied fiurther.
G. BUDGETING PROJECTS WHICH! ARE NCT COMPOdENTS OF A SYSTEM
DEVELOPMENT PLAN
The discussion of the model has thus far ignored projects which are not
related to a specific system's development plan. In the classification scheme of
this paper, thnse projects fall into Category 22, B -me- Reearch, and Category 21,
'tnagement and Support. We now turn our attention to these two categories.
The inputs required for an optimization model must answer two important
questions; what is the value of the system, and how does this value vary with cost.
Undoubtedly by the end of Chapter 3 the reader had developed an appreciation
for the difficulty in providing quantitative answers to these questions. The problem
is even more difficult when considering basic research and exploratory de',;. p: nent
prcjects. Consider a hypothetical project designed for investigatir'i military
applications of a rotary engine. Unlike a system with a development plan which
identifies expected performance characteristics, the threat it is designed to meet and
other factors, just what might result from this project is highly uncertain. Equally
uncertain is how a funding change will affect the results of the project. For these
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reasons the model will treat category 22 projects differently than it has treated
sstems.3
Define twenty sub-categories of category 22 to correspond with thp classification
scheme for systems, i.e., sub-category I would be basic research projects associated
with Air Mobility. Further define- sub-category 21, Pure Research, consisting of
all projects (excluding Management and Support) not otherwise classified. Using
the methods of Chapter 2 for determining vaiue parameters of systems, obtain a
parameter for each of the Category 22 projects. That is, for each of the projects
within the jth sub-category, obtain a consensus measure,
Vi.
Vqj
of the relative value of what is expected to result from the projects. Then use
these with et.',er the primary or secondary methoas of Chapter 2 for determining




Ideally we would now like to know how this value varies with funds so that
measures of marg'Val value could be obtained. Unfortunately basic research projects
do not lend themselves to this measuremmnt as well as system do. While an increase
in funds might result in completing the project sooner, in general this advantage
would be impossible to measure in terr... of changes in value. However, under the
assumption that for small funding changes near base case funding, the ratio of the
3 7 For a more detailed discussion of considerations pertinent to riodeling basic
research, see Quinn [ref. 101,
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marginal values of two projects are directly proportional to the ratio of their
average values, we can develop a method for investigating alternative basic research
budgets.
We must first determine a method for weasuring the value of the ith project 3 8
per total RDTE dollar, xi being spent on it, defined as
Vi
xi
the average value. Recall that on an interval scale of measurement, the particular
value assigned to the numeraire has no significance. Arbitrarily let Vq = xq. We
then have
Vi Vi Vq V Xq
A i = - - = . . . . . ..( 9 )
xi Vq xi Vq xi
Note that on this arbitrarily selected scale, the vzLue per dollar, or average value, for
the numeraire project reduces to Aq = 1. Another project which '.ad only half the
value of the numeraire but was only one-tenth as expensive would have Ai = 5.
Before turning to the development of a decision rule, let us examine the
implications of the assumption stated above. Figure 10 shows two basic research
Vi Vk
Al 7 Ak - ..S/
xi xk
Figure 10. IMPLICATIONS OF THE AVERAGE VALUE ASSUMPTION
38The sub-category subscripts j are now dropped for simplicity w ttation.
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projects each funded at a total RDTE cost of xi= xk. Their values at this base funding
were measured at 1 and % respectively. Their average values, or value per dollar, are
then measured L the slope of the dashed line from the origin. The solid curves
are hypothetical value curves which, as has been mentioned, are not known. Since
they are unknown, so is the marginal value at this funding level. If they were known
we would want to increase the one with the greatest marginal value (or decrease
the one with the smallest). Figure 10 shows that adding a dollar to the budget of
project k would cause a greater increase in value than adding it to i, even though
project i has the grea'nr average value. This discussion is added to demonstrate how
easily the assumption can be violated; the ratio of average values are not always
proportional to the ratio of marginal %alues. However, lacking information on
the curve itself, it might be further assumed that the base case funding is near the
point whcre value is "falling off". as is the case L, the left figure. in other words
the project has reached the point where hiring a few more scier. ýsts just isn't going
to add that much. With this further assumption, we not continue with an
algorithm for altering the Category 22 budget.
We wiqh to insure tnat if the budget gets increased, the projects with higher
average values receive proportionally more of the increase than those with lower
average values. Convercely, Uf the budgft is reduced, Lhe lowest average value
projects get reduced the most. These "decision rule3" are depicted in Figures 11
and 12, where
A' = max Ai and A" -min Ai
i i
Suppose a user of the model wishes to investigate the Categcry 29, buoget
program that would res'It from using this methodc for a ttial constr :nt of D million
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eq e!' e = percent
decrease
Figure 12. COMPUTING A PERCENTAGE DECREASE FOR
BASIC RESEARCH PROJECTS
dollars, less than the base case program total constraint of E million. The following
formula calculates the percentage reduction to each project that will be required to
meet this new cons'tLaint.
(A' - Ai) (E- D)= (10)0
ei (A' - Ad) Ci,4 ,7 3
i
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To illustrate the use of this formula, consider a three project basic research
program wi.th avetage value and FY 73 base funding costs as follows.
A 1 - A' - 5 C 1 = 10
A2 = 3 C2 -20
A3 - A"' - 1 C3 .- 40
Note that the total base case funding, E - 10 + 20 + 40 - 70. Fuppose the user
wished to investigate a constraint of D = 60. Equation 10 would result in the
required percentage reduction for each project as shown.
- (5-5) (70-60) 0
(5-5) (10) + (5-3) (20) + (5-1) (40) 200
(5-3) (70.60) 1
.200 - =10 percente2 200 10
(5-1) (70-60) 1
e3 200.. 20 percent
200 5
Indeed, 10 + -(20)+ -. (40) -60, and the new constraint is met.
10 10
Equation 11 is a similar formula for computing percentage incrzises from
base funding.
(Ai- A") (D E)11)
"(As- A") Ci, 4 , 73
It should te apparent that no optimization is involved in this method for altering
the budgets of Category 22 projects. What is reflected in the solution, however, is
that projects with high value per total dollar figures are increased priportionally
more and decreased less when the total Basic Research budget is alt d. Of course
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the resulting solution would have to be carefully investigated to insure that the
changes could be absorbed.
To summarize, the decision rule for altering the budgets of individual Category
22 projects is: If the budget constraint for Category 22 projects is greater (less)
that the base case constraint by an amount D - E (E - D), then increase (decrease)
each project the percentage of its base case funding as determined by Equation 11
(Equation 10).
Studying changes to the budgets of projects in Category 21, Management
and Support, is not included in this paper. In the management information system
outlined in the next chapter the user can change the total for this category, but
no method is developed here for investigating what changes might be considered
for each project. These changes would undoubtedly be made after a careful
investigatioi- of the organizational slack (fat) in each of the headquarters elements.
H. INVESTIGATING THE BUDGET LEVEL OF THE RDTE PROGRAM
A characterization of an optimal solution for a given budget constraint (i.e., an
optimal mix of systems' budgets within the RDIE program) is that there is no
other way that the funds can be distributed such that more total value will accrue
to the program. This optimal (or efficient) mix implies nothing about what the
optimal level, or total RDTE budget constraint should be. In this section a method
is developed for investigating this question.
Suppose that over the past several years, the RDTE budget has averaged about
nine percent of the total Army budget and that under current DOD fiscal guidance,
this nine percent represents 1.7 billion dollars. Suppose further that it has tentatively
been decided to fund Categories 21 and 22 at 0.7 billion. The ques, on is then,
72
should the remaining budget for systems be one billion, a little more or a little less?
Insight into this question might be gained in the following way.
Using Algorithm 2, find the approximation to the program of optimal mix for
RDTE budget constraints ranging frcm 0.9 billion to 1.1 billion, in increments of
10 million. For each of these 20 budget constraints, calculate
n
TVi
when eazh of thle n systems are funded at optimality. Plotting these against the
20 budge, constraint points might lead to a curve similar to Figure 13. If such a
nZTVi
i=I
0.9 Bihion 1 Billion 1.1 Billion Total FY 73
Funds for
R & D Systems
Figure 13. TOTAL PROGRAM VALUE VERSUS TOTAL COST CURVE
curve were to result, the implication is that increasing the budget from 0.9 to
1 billion significantly inceases the total program value, while a relatively smaller
increase is achieved when going from 1 to 1.1 billion.
It is impossible to predict without data what the shape of this curve might i
be. It will be non-decreasing, however, since it results from the addition of
systems' value curves which are non-decreasirg. Whatever its exact shape turns out
to be will determine how much insight into the problem this exercis. might provide.
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For example, if a generally linear curve were to result, or c.O,e where no discernable
change in the rate of increase was apparent, relatively little insight would be
provided in comparison with that implied by the Figure 13 curve. In fact a
linear curve would provide no guidance in selecting a "proper" budget level, since
it reflects no decrease at all in the rate at which total progra.m vilue increases ES
funds are increased.
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V. IMPLEMENTING THE MODEL AS A
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
Although the solution algorithms for this model ure relatively simple, they
require a great deal of data manipulation. The repetitious nature of these calculations
lend themselves to computerization, and the model itself to a computer assisted
management information system (MIS). In this chapter an MIS which could implement
CARDBOMB is outlined; one which seems to be suitable for incorporation intG
the DEAN MACHINE system. The specific desires of the principal users would
undoubtedly result in an MIS quite different than the one proposed here. This
chapter is designed more to point out the potential uses of the model in assisting
with the RDTE budget planning problem, and the relative simplicity or the computer
programs required. It might alse prove to be a usetul starting point in the develop-
ment of a working MIS.
A. THE BACK-UP SEGMENT OF TH1E MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
Unlike pure costing models which, over time, tend to become "believeable"
to users when their time saving capabilities and accuracy have been demonstrated,
an optimization model of this type which incorporates many factors of a subjective
nature and manipulates them in an almost "magical" fashion has to be clearly
understood to be useful. The amount of insight into a decision problem that a
particular solution might provide is directly proportionzl to how well the user
understands the model.3 9 Consequently an MIS must consist of more than just a
3 9 For a discussion of some of the pitfalls of designing an MIS. o Ackoff
[ref. 111.
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method for allowing a user to interface with a computer. A users' manual which
clearly states the assumptions, approximations, methods, capabilities and limitations
of the model is an integral part of the MIS. Equally important is a document to
which the user can refer when studying the parameters of systems he might wish
to check while investigating a specific solution the model recommends. Although
OCRD produces a Project Listing of the Program 6 base case, it is organized in the
format of the budget and recognizing which projects belong to which systems is
sometimes a difficult task. Additionally, only five years of cost information is
available in this document. The reports of the Military Procurement Priority
Review Board have systems' priorities and costs, but generally not broken down by
projects. The DCP's for each system have a great amount of information for the
base case, but this model also requires four alternatives to the base. Consequently,
should CARDBOMB be implemented, it is recommcndcd that a RDTE System's
Data Report be prepared and kept current. Besides being of aTeat assistance
to users of the model, it cculd prove to be an excellent planning document. A
great deal of cost and effectiveness information on each system would be centralized,
visible, and readily available for five alternative development plans. Such a dc.cument
and the model itself, would no doubt be most efficiently maintained somewhere in
the planning staff of OCRD, although its potential users might be personnel from
the offices of the Director of the Army Budget, the Budget Review Committee, and
the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, in addition to OCRD.
B. OPTIONAL USER INPUTS
It is envisioned that this MIS wouid operate in a manner simi!ar to the DEAN
MACHINE system; i.e., the user-computer interface would be through a cathode ray
tube (CRT) console. The user types in simple instyuctions and solutions are displayed
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on a television screen before him. Some of these instructfons are presented in this
section.
Since the model is designed to handle rlternative methods for altering the RDTE
budget, (e.g., alter the budget constraint and do not consider slipping, fix the
constraint and consider slipping, alter the time preference strategy, etc.) the
computer program segment of the MIS must allow for the input of thLAe options
if it !s to be efficient in terms of running time and storage space. Consequently,
a user should have the capability of inputing miy oi the following options.
1. Select a time preference strategy The most time consuming operation the
program might be required to accomplish would be the construction of
the TVi versus cost curves, calculation of She marginal values (slopes), and
the ordering of these slopes in decreasing sequence. It might therefore be
desireable to have in atorage, pre-constructed budget incrementing matrices
for alternative strategies. A great deal of computer time could be saved
this way. Theyefore the following time preference strategy options might
be made availible.
Option 1, a Shoit Range (a, b, c) Strategy, where the parameters are those
determined "best" in the test of the modjl against the base case (Chapter 4,
Section C).
Option 2, Netral (1, 1, 1) Strategy.
Option 3, Long Range (c, b, a) Strategy, using the same parameters as
Option 1, but in reverse order
Opticn 4, User selects his own parameters. As has been stuted, the analyst
should not impose a strategy on the decision maker. Option 4 allows the
user to input his own time preference parameters, but he should be made
aware of the fact tlit the solution will take much longer to obtain.
2. Change any parameters? As familiarity with the model grows, the user
may decide that he is not in agreement with some of the relative value,
readiness d,-te distributions or other parameters on file. Alternatively
he may wish to test the sensitivity of a particular solution to some of
the value, cost or other parameters. Here he is given the ,option to
temporarily char.;: any of the parameters he wishes. This could be
accompILshed by typing a code number (defined in Section C) to identify
the parameters and the new value he desires to use.
3. Should the model consider slipping? A simple yes-no ans'.',. to this question
would be sufficient to insure that tho proper subroutines ,•ere used.
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4. What fiscal year is being investigated? To answer this question the user
types in the year. Although the development of the model dealt primarily
with the.first year (FY 73), any budget year can be investigated. Suppose
for a particular FY 73 constraint the optimal solution resulted in a total
FY 75 cost that was considered unreasonable. A constraint could then
be Imposed on FY 75 and the funding levels of systems be reduced until
this new constraint is met.
5. Select the total RDTE budget constraint. The user would answer this
question by typing in the dollar constraint he wishes to investigate.
6. Select the constraint for basic research. If this were the same as for the
base case, the model would by-pass the subroutine designed to alter the
Category 22 budget. If it were different, the model would calculate a
new Category 22 budget according to the decision rules discussed in
Chapter 4, Section G.
7. Select the constraint for management and support. The model does
nothing with this other than to subtract if from the total constraint to
determine how much is left for the remaining systems. Should this
constraint be less than the base case, the difference would represent the
user's personal judgement of the "organizational slack" that can beS~absorbed.
8. Sc.zct the output options. At this poi 11 the user informrs the computer
program what he desires to see in the way of output. Discussion of what
these options might b is deferred to Section D of this chapter.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE DATA INPUTS
A large number of data inputs are required for the use of CARDBOMB. How
these are organized can have a significant effect on the efficiency of the cormputer
program. Appendix B outlines the computer program and subroutines that woula
be needed for implementing the MIS in the fash;on pruposed in this chaipter. As
mentioned in the discussion on inputing strategy -ntions, it has incorporated
a trade-off of data storage for reduced running time. The following files would
be required for operat-ng the MIS in the manner proposed in Appendix B.
IgL Budget Incrementing Matrix (BIM) for strategy option 1. The format
for this pre-constructed matrix might be as was shown in Figure 7, page 5F)I File 2, 1 1 for strategy option 2. Same format.
F BIM for strategy option 3. Same forrrat.
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File4 Systems' Parameter File. In order to use strategy option 4 or to change
some of the parameters, a file consisting of the inputs required for constructing
TV, versus cost curves is needed, Of course, this file is also necessary for










Figure 14. FORMAT FOR FILE 4
Note that a code (iQ) would be sufficient to identify the parameter that a
user might wish to change.
File 5 Basic Research Projects. The mathematical operations used in investigating
alternative Category 22 budgets are different than those for systems. Grouping
these projects separately allows for the separate investigation of alternative basic








Figure 15. FORMAT FOR FILE 5
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File 6 Yearly Budget Schedule. It may have been noted in the formats
recommended for the other five files that neither annual RDTE nor total
PEMA and OMA costs for systems were included. This, of course, could
early have been done. However since the user is only investigating one year
at a time, collecting this data in a separate file can assist in saving core storage
space. Figure 16 shows the format this file might take. Note that if the user
were investigating the FY 73 budget, only the columns pertaining to that
year would need to be called into core memory.
[ - f=2 f -1- . .. .. .
Total Annual RDTE RDTE RDTE ,•orE






Figure 16. FORMAT FOR FILE 6
Fe 7, Financial Data File. Like the DEAN MACHINE, this model might be
called upon to act as a "report generator", transforming cost data from one
budget format to another. None of the files outlined thus far contain inform-
ation on the costs (or identity) of the projects which compose the systems.
This information could be included in Filt 7. Although Appen•ix B does
not outline routines for incorporation of a report generation capability, this
feature could be -nade a part of CARDBOMB.
D. RELATINC COMPUTER OUTPUTS TO INFORMATIO.4 REQUIREMENTS
There are a number of capabilities of CARDBOMB that a user might wish to
employ. Allowing him to select an output option insures that the proper subroutines
are called and the particular information he is seeking is displayed. How much
information is required at a given time would direct whether it wou be best
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displayed on the CRT or on a computer print-out. The following list of output
options is not intended to be exhaustive. It might further demonstrate how the MIS
could be used, however.
1. CRT display of changes from the base case. Normally a user would wish
to focus his attention on the changes that resulted from his inputing a
new parameter or budget constraint. This could be accomplished by a
visual display of the new versus base funding schedules of the system or
basic research projects which changed.
2. CRT display of changes from the last solution. It is envisioned that the
model would be used in an iterative fashion, i.e., once a solution is generated
with a certain set of parameters, the user might wisli fo employ another
option to see how it affects this solution.
3. CRT Summary Display. The new and base funding schedules aggregated for
each of the 22 categories might also be of interest.
4. CRT display of the 12 rows of the Budget Incrementing Matrix bracketing
the total budget constraint. For a particular budget constraint the model
recommends changes based on this matrix. The user might also wish to
see what other changes would be recommended if the constraint were
sl!•htly greater or slightly less. Twelve r;,ws are selected because of the
12 line output capability of the CRT.
5. Computer print-out of a Budget Incrementing Matrix. The BIM is an
ordered list of increases to the budgets of systems as the total budget
constraint is increased. Although it is only an approximation to the
optimal solution, it could be used as a readily available planning document
for answering the "What do you think we should do if the budget is cut"
type question.
6. Print-out of the slip sequence list.
7. Print-out of the dr'op sequence list.
8. Print-out of detailed funding schedules of all systems at optimality.
9. Print-out of the complete RDTE budget in alternative formats.
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VI. SUMMARY
Throughout this paper an attempt has been made to point out both the capabil-
ities and limitations of the methods used in the model. CARDBOMB is not meant
to be either a "cure-all" for the RDTE budgeting problem or the final answer for
the contribution analytical models might provide. What the model can do is
provide logical consistency between information gathered in the relatively "quiet"
planning phase and the budget decisions made during the "crunch" period. Even
during the "crunch" it is not envisioned that the solutions generated by the model
should be arbitrarily accepted. However the budget feasible changes it recommends
should serve to narrow the focus for a more careful investigation, one, which might
be well served by the comprehensive data bank.
A. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS REVIEWED
CARDBOMB has addressed individually the entire range of alternatives that
can be employed for altering the RDTE budget. These were; increase or decrease
the budgets of systems or projects, slip a system one or more ye-ars, add or drop
a system or project from the program, and alter the RDTE budget total. Various
analytical methods were used as noted below.
Based on subjective value judgements of category experts and cost data supplied
by program managers, value versus cost curves were determined for each system.
Then for a particular budget constraint, an algorithm was used to generate an approxi-
mation to the optimal RDTE budget. In thit way trade-offs of value for coot were
accomplished for each system, but considered as a part of the total ýogram, not
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as an individual system. By this approximation method increases or decreases to
the budgets of systems are recommended. Basic research and exploratory development
projects are recommended for reduction or increase based on a decision rule which
insures that percentage increases (decreases) are applied to the budget of projects
which are directly (inversely) proportional to their average values.
Dropping a system or project is also handled on an average value criteria.
Because the model treats value interdependently and PEMA and OMA costs as negative
value, its usefulness for assisting with this decision is limited. However it could be
used to focus attention for further investigation on those systems with comparatively
low average values.
When deciding whether or not a proposed system's development plan should
be undertaken, the model can assist by identifying what needs to be given up in
the RDTE program in terms of reduced funding levels for other systems. It can also
help to identify the optimal funding level, i.e., the trade-off of cost for potential
performance. Additionally, by comparing its average value with that of other systems,
insight might be gained on whether or not the development plan should be undertaken.
The decision on whether or not to slip a system is handled by determining a
yearly loss in value that would result, aid recommending those systems for slipping
whose loss in value is less than the gain that would be achieved by raising the
funding levels of other systems.
It is hoped that the model could add insight into the "proper" total budget
constraint by plotting a total value versus total budget curve in a budget interval
around the historical percentage of the total Army budget. As mentioned ir
Chapter 4, the usefulness of this method is dependent on the shape of the resulting
curve.
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B. EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL
Some of the limitations discussed above are limitations only to the extent that
they were beyond the scope of this paper. The interdependence of value of the
systems which cause the model to be limited in its application to the add and drop
decisions have been discussed at length by Weingartner [ref. 9], and theoretical
models in the general category of project selection are available which could be
adapted to CARDBOMB. The treatment of costs, however, would have to be
handled differently, i.e., PEMA and OMA uncour:'ed from the measurement of
value. This would suggest that perhaps the real problem is not the optimization
of the RDTE budget but rather the optimization of the RDTE, PEMA and OMA
budgets combined. Techniques similar to those used in this paper could undoubtedly
be applied in most cases to this vastly expanded model.
The average value decision ruie for basic research projects, though intuitively
appealing since it says to add the most money to those which are expected to
return the most value per dollar, is not theoretically sound. The appropriate
measurement for incremental changes in budgets is marginal value, not average
value. A more thorough examination of Catego-y 22 projects might suggest a
more appropriate structure for modeling Basic Research.
Of course a very important extension of the model would De to implement it
and see if it is useful in assisting i'n the RDTE budgeting problem. This would be
a sizeable task th-t would no doubt be best accomplished in stages. For example
very little would need to be changed in the computer programs for the final model
if they were first written to accommodate the systems from only one category.
Perhaps Category 5, STANOS, might be a suitable starting point sin(-,C all these
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systems come under a single program manager. Since the data manipulations for





This appendix is an extension of some of the concepts discussed in the main body
of the paper. Details concerning these concepts were purposely omitted from the body
of the text so that it would be more easily read by individuals not thoroughly
familiar with the jargon of Operations Research. For those readers with an OR
background, this appendix should assist in clarifying two important questions; what
is embodied in the value parameters, and what is the formulation of the optimization
program.
The concept of relative value as used in this paper is simil3r to that found in
Fishburn (ief. 12]. Let V be a value function which maps 2 real number V(sij) to
a system sij from the set of systems Sj in the jth category. The survey respondent
accomplishes this mapping considering
1. Sj
2. N1; the set of all perceived needs for systems in the jth category, where
N1 is a function of,
3. E; the environment - his perception of the enemy threat, the range
of possible scenarios, etc.
That is:
V(s1i) - Visi; Sj, N3(E)I
With the usual convention that if sij is considered more valuable than skj then
V(sij) > V(skj), the optimization methods used require that V be unique up to
an increasing linear transformation. In other words, the results of the survey on
the zero-ten scale must be considered to have established an interval 'cale of
measurement, meaning that shifting the origin of tae scale or multiplying it by a
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positive constant will leave the relative lengths of the intervals between V(sij)
unchanged. For example:
V(sij) - V(skj) aV(sij) + b - [aV(sk j) + b f
= •- for a -> 0
V(sij) - V(smj) aV(ij) + b - [aV(smj) + b]
This requirement for an interval scale of measurement could be tested by surveying
again to confirm that the zero-ten scale produces the same relative interval results
as, for example, a zero-one hundred scale.
When the primary method (see page A,9) is used to relate the value of each
system to that of a program iuumeraire, the high-level DA managers are asked to
use the "ranking-rating" method for each of the category numeraires. Thus they
are being asked to map real numbers to the values of these systems considering:
1. S1 ,..., S20; the sets of systems in each category.
2. S'; the set of numeraire systems.
3. N1 1 ... , N20 ; the set of needs in each category.
4. E; the environment
That is:
V(sqj) = V[sqj; S1 .... , S2 0 , S', NI(E), . N20(E),
Using the primary method for relating the value parameters of all the systems requires
that the mappirig V(sqj) should also result in an interval scale of measurement. The
use of equation 2, page 29, is equivalent to finding "a" in the linear transformation,
i.e., determining the rconstant
Vqj
Vq,1
which compresses or stretches the value scale of the jth category to ake it
commensurate with the scale of the program numeraire.
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VThe secondary method, page 30, also seeks to determine
Vqj
Vq,l
but in a different manner. To use equation 4, page 32,
Nj
N1
must be detd•rmined by survey. The high-level managers must consider:
1. N1 ,..., N20
2. E
The value function mapping is then:
V(Nj) = V[INj; NI(E), ... ,N20(E)]
All the value measurement methods discussed in the text also require the additivity
assumption, i.e.,
V(slj + s2j +... + sij) = V(s 1 j) + V(s2j) + ... + V(sij) for i=1, ... , nj
For this assumption to hold, systems must be carefully defined. For example, a
weapon and its platform must be one system. The assumption could be tested
(with great effort) with surveys designed along the lines of the Churchman-Ackoff
method for obtaining measures of relative value (see Burington [ref. 6, p. 26]). In
brief, this would require that each pair of systems, then each triplet, etc., be tested
by survey to insure that the additivity assumption holds.
Without any testing of the parameters obtained by the "ranking-rating" method,
there is no way of insuring that consistent judgement has been applied in fo.-mulating
the value function, V. In other words it must be presumed that the usual axioms
for the existence of a real valued utility functioui hcld, i.e.. that the reference
relation is reflexive, symetric and transitive. (See, for example, Fi.. ,rn [ref. 12,
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p. 1671). The testing required to insure that the axioms hold would result in a very
sizeable surveying effort, one which is felt by the author to be an unreasonable
undertaking in practice due to the time that might be allotted. Eckenrode [ref. 13]
has shown in a limited test of the rating method that no statistically significant
differences in results were obtained from this method and some of the more complex
ones which do test for compliance with the axioms. Of course his study has only
limited relevance to this particular problem. Consequently, the parameters which
result from the relatively simple methods outlined in the body of the text should
not be viewed as being perfectly correlated with some "actual" real valued
utility function for the Department of the Army. The sensitivity of a solution
to the relative value parameters used should always be checked.
Algorithm 1, page 55, results from the formulation of the problem as a
mathematic- program in the following way.
0 0 0
We wish to find the optimal funding levelf0 (fl, f2 , ... fn) which
maximimizes the total value of the program and satisfies the budget constraint for
the year being investigated. That is:
Maximize: g(f)
Subject to: h( f )Bt
For the ith system, the problem has been formulated as:
TVi(xi) Z dt•* at" Pt(Xi) • Vi~xi 0, si~j, Sj, Nj(E)]
t
Although a separable programming approach is not the only formulation that might
be considered, it does result in the simplest solution methods. For g( f ) to be a
separable function it is necessary to assume that:
Vi~xi , sij, Sj, Nj(E)J - Vi(xi)
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that is, the value of the ith system is independent of the values of all the others. As
discussed in the text, it has been assumed that in the funding range [f - 2,..., f - 61
this independence of systems' value holds. "Very often the choice between indcend-
ence or not is a choice between 'divide and conquer with approximations' or 'don't
divide and don't conquer at all.' " Fishburn [ref. 12, p. 295]. However "don't
conquer at all" is not quite the case with this problem. As has been stated,
Weingartner [ref. 9] discusses a number of models that take in'o account the
interdependence of value. Some of them would be appropriate for the "add" and
"drop" decisior, and could be adapted to CARDBOMB.
With the assumption of independence of valve, the program becomes:
Maximize: g(f) =  TVi(xi)
i
Subject to: h(f) • Bt
The budget constraint equation is logically separable into the year t budgets
for each of the systems, i.e., h(f) Ci,t(fi) ! Bt, where Cit(fi) is a discrete function
i
in f, the five finding levels. The final mathematical program is then:
Maximize: Z TVi(xi)
i
Subject to: Z Cit(fi) S Bt
I
f fi,k fork 2, or3...or6
Algorithm 1 accomplishes this optimization by first calculating the marginal values,
Ii,k, of raising the funding level from f k to f = k + 1; i.e.,
TVi(f ik+l) TVi(fi,k)Si,k =for k f ,
Xi,k+1 - xi,k
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When the set of Sik are ordered in decreasing sequence, iteratively increasing the
funding levels according to this sequence insures that the increase has been added
to the system with the highest gain in value per total RDTE dollar increase. However
as was pointed out or, page 54, this is not necessarily tha optimal increase when a
year t budget constraint is considered. Lacking information on these year t
constraints for the out-years, the question becomes one of choosing a criteria;
either maximize value considering the marginal value of total cost or the marginal
value of year t cost. Of course Algorithm 1 uses the former criteria, but a user
of the model might also wish to investigate a solution resulting from the latter. The
two solutions would be identical if the percentage differences in total cost between
each funding level were the same as the percentage differences in year t costs for
all systems. In this case the sequence of si,k would be the same as a sequence
resulting from using Ci,f+l,t - Ci,f,t in the denominator of the si,k formula.
A nuirber of nonlinear programming search techniques might be applicable
to finding the global optimum for a particular year t budget constraint. Unfortunately
until such time as data might be collected and the shape of the TVi versus year t
cost curves determined, it is impossible to predict how divergent the two solutions
would be, or to retommend a particular solution algorithm. Of course if these curves
were also conc ve in the region of positive value, using a sequence of marginal values





This appendix is added to demonstrate the reasonably simple nature of the
computer program that would be required to implement CARDBOMB. It is designed
to give the reader a better understand of the MIS outlined in Chapter 5, not to
present a detailed programming flow chart. Readers with some familiarity with
programming may note that the computer operations required are neither complex
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From the Inputed Code, Identify
Parameters That Changed
Call the Appropriate Row (System)from File 4
Calculate the New TV.. Values in
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the Routine in Figure 18
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